Session Cases Exceptional Cases

Occasionally the Scottish Courts hear cases of intense topical significance. In advance of any full law report that may appear later in Session Cases® the Council may choose to publish reports, written by law reporters who attend those hearings, for public information and education.

If ancillary material, such as written submissions by the parties, are made available to the Council for publication these may also included on these pages.

Dale Vince & Others v The Prime Minister & The Advocate General for Scotland

The following is a summary of the oral submissions that were presented at the Hearing before the First Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session on Thursday 8 October 2019, prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance


1. The court heard arguments on behalf of the petitioners and reclaimers (represented by Aidan O’Neill QC and David Welsh, Advocate) and the respondents (represented by David Johnston QC, Andrew Webster QC and Chris Pirie, Advocate).

2. The petitioners reclaimed against the decision of Lord Pentland pronounced on 7 October 2019 in which the petition for implement and interdict was refused (Vince v Prime Minister [2019] CSOH 77).

3. The petitioners also sought the following orders in a petition presented to the Inner House under the nobile officium: “(i) to make orders to the following effect in the exercise of this court’s nobile officium: (a) ordaining that a letter in the form set out in the Schedule to the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019 be drawn up and signed by the Clerk of Court on behalf of the Prime Minister, (b) ordaining that this letter so signed be sent to the President of the European Council, (c) issuing a declarator that a letter in this form sent by this court shall substitute for, and shall be for all purposes and effects in law equivalent to, the letter which the Prime Minister was and is under a statutory obligation to sign and send to the President of the European Council; (ii) to impose such other conditions and penalties (including fine and imprisonment, where consistent with the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019) as to the court shall in all the circumstances seem proper and appropriate in the event of the order not being implemented; (iii) to make such order to dispose of this petition as the court thinks fit…”

4. The following oral submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.

Submissions on behalf of the petitioners and reclaimers

5. The reclaiming motion should be allowed. An order in the petition to the nobile officium should be granted but extract of the decree should be superseded until 21 October 2019.

6. It was noted that no undertakings had been offered by the Prime Minister (‘the PM’) in the proceedings before the Lord Ordinary. No reasons were advanced to explain that failure. It was a standard practice for undertakings to be offered on the part of government where that was appropriate, and this court often relied upon them.

7. The significance of an undertaking was that, if breached, the court’s contempt jurisdiction could be invoked. If it were accepted that the answers to the petition lodged on behalf of the respondent (in which it was accepted that the PM was under a duty to send the letter) could allow the court to invoke its contempt jurisdiction, then, for the comfort of the petitioners, that should be confirmed in open court by the respondent.

8. The answers appeared to be clear as to what the PM accepted was his statutory duty. However, the first time that had been accepted by the PM was when the answers were lodged on 3 October. The problem was that there had been clear briefing from No 10 Downing Street that any acceptance before this court as to the PM’s duties was not fully and properly binding on him.

9. There had been political statements made – even after the answers were lodged – that were a repudiation of those answers. That was important and it could not simply be dismissed as the PM’s aides going ‘off message’ or speaking in an ill-considered manner.

10. This was government-sanctioned policy. Statements made in the public domain were to the effect that the government would push for a no deal Brexit, whatever the Benn Act said. These statements had been repeated over the weekend too.

11. In the Telegraph yesterday there had been an article in which it was said that the PM was going to go to the Supreme Court to challenge the Benn Act and avoid sending the letter. It was said by the source of the article that it was important that the PM be forced to sign the letter rather than do so voluntarily.

12. This was contradictory to what the PM said in his answers. That was significant as the Lord Ordinary proceeded on the basis that he could rely upon what was said on behalf of the PM in court. The PM had a duty to be consistent in his view and to uphold the rule of law. But instead he was saying what people wanted him to say: saying one thing to sympathetic journalists and another to the court.

13. In the Spectator this morning an article was published that stated the PM would try to scupper any delay to Brexit. That would be contrary to the frustration principle.

14. It was clear that it was official government policy to undermine the policy of the 2019 Act by attempting to bully other EU countries into refusing to grant an extension. That was unlawful as it was contrary to the frustration principle set out in the Padfield case.

15. That was why the petitioners had difficulty in accepting the conclusion of the Lord Ordinary that the PM could be trusted to comply with the 2019 Act. Those advising the PM had a different understanding of the PM’s intentions and it was not good enough to dismiss the statements made as mere politics. This was politics being used to subvert the rule of law.

16. This was serious stuff and the PM appeared to be speaking to his base, to use a Trumpian phrase. When they go low, the rule of law goes high.

17. In relation to the nobile officium, its function was to preserve the rule of law. It was accepted that this was an unprecedented step, but these were unprecedented times.

18. The court could grant an order under the nobile officium but still give the PM the opportunity to comply with the 2019 Act and comply with the assurances he had given to the court. By suspending extract of the decree until 21 October 2019 the PM could be given the chance to comply with the law and send the letter. Only if he failed to do so would the decree be extracted and the letter signed on his behalf on the authority of the court.

19. Section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988 was not an alternative remedy, as it concerned enforcement against individuals. Only the nobile officium could give real protection by requiring the letter to be signed.

20. The Lord President asked whether the Lord Ordinary could have authorised signature of the letter. It was submitted that the Lord Ordinary has refused any remedy but that did not preclude the exercise of the court’s nobile officium jurisdiction in this case. It was an unprecedented situation and the court was being asked to ensure that the policy of the 2019 Act was fully realised.

21. It was accepted that the sending of the letter involved the conduct of foreign affairs but the prerogative power to conduct foreign affairs was not untrammelled. It was subject to the rule of law, as the Supreme Court held in the Miller case. Even more importantly, when it came to EU law, the prerogative power could not be used to adversely affect private EU law rights.

22. The court had the power to make the order sought in the nobile officium petition. There was a reasonable apprehension that the PM would not comply with the 2019 Act – no clear undertaking had been given.

23. It was accepted that the nobile officium was an equitable remedy but this was no bar to the orders being granted in this case. Similarly, the fact that there was no precedent was no bar to the remedies sought. The purpose of the nobile officium jurisdiction was to provide a practical and workable solution to legal problems where the law provides not answers.

24. Previous cases established that where a party was unable or unwilling to sign a document he was legally obliged to sign, the nobile officium would be invoked to authorise the clerk of court to sign on behalf of the recalcitrant person. That was the situation here. Necessity was established by a clear refusal to sign. Those cases had clear parallels to the present one.

25. An order of court authorising the signing of the letter on behalf of the PM was the only way to preserve the rule of law. It was the only effective remedy available to the petitioners.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

Reclaiming motion

26. The reclaiming motion should be refused and the decision of the Lord Ordinary adhered to. The grounds of appeal would be addressed in turn.

27. In relation to the ground of appeal 1, it was submitted that the Lord Ordinary did not err in holding that there was a reasonable apprehension of a breach of statutory duty.

28. This was the primary argument before the Lord Ordinary. The weight to be attached to the statements relied upon by the petitioners was a matter for the judgment of the Lord Ordinary and the Inner House could only interfere with that assessment if the Lord Ordinary erred in principle or if his decision was clearly wrong.

29. The Lord Ordinary was entitled to weigh those statements in the balance against the clear position adopted by the PM in his answers. The Lord Ordinary did not say that he did not look at the statements. He did so but attached little weight to them, as he was entitled to do.

30. The government was entitled to have a policy inconsistent with the Act, which was introduced by the opposition. That did not mean that the government would not comply with its terms. The government was entitled to promote its policies publicly without frustrating the Act and was entitled to express its views on it.

31. It was also significant that the Act allowed for space to negotiate. The government was entitled to maintain its policy position that the UK should leave the EU on 31 October 2019 and could negotiate in the meantime. There was room for negotiations in the Act. The court should be very slow to enter into the negotiating field.

32. The Lord Ordinary was correct to view the statements relied upon by the petitioners in the political context and to weigh them in the balance against the clear statements made to the court on behalf of the PM.

33. The Lord Ordinary was entitled to rely upon statements made in the answers and in court by Law Officers of the Crown. The court frequently relied upon such statements. Such statements had significant and overwhelming weight.

34. In contrast, the statements relied upon by the petitioners were not all made by the PM, some of them pre-dated the Act, some were made in Parliament and subject to parliamentary privilege, they were made in the context of political rhetoric, and some public statements of the PM stating that he would comply with the Act were ignored by the petitioners.

35. The Lord Ordinary was entitled to weigh all that material in the balance and conclude that there was no reasonable apprehension of breach of the Act.

36. Turning to ground of appeal 2, it was submitted that this was essentially a restatement of the first ground. This was in any event a point not taken before the Lord Ordinary. Ultimately, the Lord Ordinary was entitled to attach great weight to answer 8 and he did not err in doing so.

37. In relation to ground of appeal 3, the Lord Ordinary did not err. The exercise of foreign affairs powers would not affect EU rights, as any deal reached with the EU would require to be approved by parliament, as could be seen when the previous deal was rejected. The point was that negotiations did not affect rights.

38. The petitioners adopted too narrow a view of the frustration principle and failed to recognise that the 2019 Act allowed for negotiations to be carried out.

39. In relation to ground of appeal 4, it was accepted by the petitioners that the only reason why the PM was a respondent, and the only reason he had any duties under the 2019 Act, was due to him holding the office of PM. There was nothing in this ground.

40. Lastly, ground of appeal 5 was irrelevant. Reference to the Brexit cliff edge amounted to no more than saying that the case was urgent. However, urgency was totally irrelevant to the question of whether there was a reasonable apprehension of breach of the Act.

41. Urgency may be relevant to the question of remedy but had nothing to do with the merits of the case.

42. The main issue before the Lord Ordinary was reasonable apprehension and he decided the case on that basis.

43. The Lord Ordinary did not err.

Petition to nobile officium

44. It was submitted that the petitioners had failed to address the threshold requirement. The existence of section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988 completed removed the requirement for resort to the nobile officium.

45. The cases involving signature of conveyancing documents relied upon by the petitioners did not involve public law issues. In all the cases there was an enforceable legal obligation that was not complied with. There was no such failure in this case, in which there were clear statements that the PM would comply with the 2019 Act.

46. There was an alternative remedy available, the problem for the petitioners being that it had been refused. That did not justify exercise of the nobile officium jurisdiction.

47. There was a practical issue as to what the European Commission would make of a letter signed by the clerk of court and not the PM.

48. At this stage it was observed by the Lord President that were any order to be granted, the letter would be signed by a higher authority than the clerk of court.

49. This was not an extraordinary case therefore the test for invoking the nobile officium jurisdiction had not been met.

Reply on behalf of petitioners

50. The alternative to extract being superseded was a fresh petition for judicial review being raised after 21 October. That did not allow enough time.

51. Having regard to the Vienna Convention, there would be no difficulty in the European Council receiving a letter signed by a suitable person.


Dale Vince & Others v Prime Minister

The following is a summary of the oral submissions at the hearing of Friday 4 October 2019, prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance.


1. The court heard legal arguments on behalf of the petitioners (represented by Aidan O’Neill QC and David Welsh, Advocate) and the respondents (represented by Andrew Webster QC and Chris Pirie, Advocate).

2. The petitioners sought orders in the following terms:

(i) To interdict the first respondent [the Prime Minister] and any other Minister of the Crown … and anybody acting on their behalf or at their request from taking any action that would undermine or frustrate the will of the Union Parliament as enacted in the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, particularly (but not restricted to):

(a) taking any steps (or causing steps to be taken) to send alongside the letter that is required to be sent by section 1(4) of the 2019 Act any other document, message, statement or any other addendum, addition or amendment that would seek to suggest that the intention of the United Kingdom is anything other than that set out in the letter in the schedule to the 2019 Act,

(b) taking any steps (or causing any steps to be taken) to delay the sending of the letter that is required to be sent by section 1(4) of the 2019 Act or otherwise causing it not to be received by the President of the European Council,

(c) encouraging (or causing to be encouraged) any other Member State of the European Union either directly or indirectly to disagree with any proposed extension of the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union ending at 11pm on 31 October 2019; and to grant interdict ad interim; [and]

(ii) To ordain the first respondent [the Prime Minister] in the event that neither section 1(1) nor 1(2) of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 has been satisfied by 11pm on 18 October 2019 to sign and send prior to 3pm on 19 October 2019 the letter set out in the schedule to the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 without any amendment, alteration or addition (either in the letter or in any separate letter, note, addendum or message) and to take all steps that shall be required in order to obtain from the European Council an extension of the period under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on European Union ending at 11pm on 31 October 2019.”

3. The following oral submissions were advanced on behalf of the parties.

Submissions on behalf of the petitioners

4. On behalf of the petitioners, orders were sought in terms of the prayer of the petition, namely (i) interdict in relation to ‘non-frustration’, and (ii) an order for specific performance in terms of section 45(b) of the Court of Session Act 1988. The latter order was said to be necessary given the public statements made by or on behalf of the Prime Minister, such that the petitioners did not have sufficient assurance that he would comply with the law.

5. The further orders sought, to the effect that (iii) the Prime Minister is required to sign and send the letter required in terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019, (iv) interdict predicated on such a letter having been sent, and (v) further orders in the event of non-compliance with any other orders of the court, could be ‘held over’ to a later stage.

6. The petitioners suggested that formal undertakings could be given to the court by the respondents and recorded in the minute of [the court’s] proceedings, essentially setting out the admissions already contained in the answers to the petition (specifically, Answer 8), in which case the court would not be required to pronounce any ‘coercive orders’ at this stage. Thereafter, if such undertakings were not complied with, the full contempt jurisdiction of the court would come into play.

7. Whilst no undertakings had been offered, it was said to have been suggested by the respondents (in their written note of argument) that the Prime Minister’s ‘affirmation’ (in answer to the petition) of the legal duties upon him was sufficiently clear and unequivocal to make orders unnecessary. This was said on behalf of the petitioners to be ‘something less than formal undertakings, but edging towards it’.

8. Under reference to the respondents’ challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, the petitioners submitted that the court’s jurisdiction was not dependent upon the issue as to where the Prime Minister was currently domiciled as an individual, nor was it important that the Prime Minister is not currently living in Scotland. Ministers of the Crown, including the Prime Minister, were deemed to be domiciled throughout the United Kingdom. Further, and in any event, the respondents had accepted that the court has jurisdiction in relation to the Advocate General for Scotland, as the Law Officer for the UK Government in Scotland. The petitioners submitted that the cases against the UK Government, and in particular the Prime Minister in respect of the duties imposed upon him as holder of that office, were ‘so closely connected’ that it was expedient and proper for the court to exercise jurisdiction.

9. Upon questioning by the court, as to whether the Prime Minister was being sued as an individual or only in his capacity as a Minister of the Crown, the petitioners stated that the position was ‘slightly hybrid’ insofar as the claim against the Prime Minister was in respect of statements made by him, which were said to amount to ‘suggestions’ and ‘threats’ that he, as Prime Minister, will not carry out the duties imposed upon him by the 2019 Act. There arose from such statements a reasonable apprehension that he would not obey the law whilst holding the office of Prime Minister. Whilst he held the office of Prime Minister, such ‘threats’ amounted to legal wrongs. The respondents’ position was misconceived insofar as it demonstrated concern for the Prime Minister’s status as an individual, and their plea in law to that effect ought to be repelled.

10. The respondents’ position was also said to be misconceived to the extent of the challenge to the competency of the procedure adopted, whereby the respondents sought refusal or at least dismissal of the petition quoad orders (ii) and (iv). According to the petitioners, proceedings brought under section 45(b) of the Court of Session Act 1988, rather than proceedings for judicial review, were appropriate as the petitioners were not seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the court (McKenzie v Scottish Ministers 2004 SLT 1236, Lord Carloway at para 17). The fact that the application concerned matters of public law did not mean that it had to be brought by way of judicial review, at least according to Scots law. The petitioners were not concerned with the process behind, or reasons why the Prime Minister should be making the ‘threats’ of which the petitioners referred to. Nor were they asking for a review or setting aside of those threats, or asking for them to be withdrawn. They were concerned merely with the fact that those statements had been made, and formed part of a ‘continuing course of conduct’ which, given the consistency with which certain phrases had been used, appeared to represent official government policy rather than ‘a frolic of his own’ on the part of the Prime Minister. The petitioners were simply saying that the Prime Minister cannot defy the law, whereas it was repeatedly threatened that the Prime Minister will not comply with his obligations under the 2019 Act, or will sabotage or frustrate the will of Parliament, with various suggestions as to how that might be done. According to the petitioners, these amounted to a series of ‘completed acts’, and the petitioners were reasonably apprehensive that those threatening words will ‘imminently be translated to unlawful deeds’, and therefore applied for the remedies sought before the court. As an application in respect of threats to fail to perform public law duties, therefore, the summary procedure of a petition in terms of section 45(b) of the 1988 Act was the appropriate and competent manner in which to proceed.

11. As to the remedies sought, the nature of proceedings as public law rather than civil proceedings, meant that it was open to the court, if so advised, to pronounce coercive orders against Ministers of the Crown, including the Prime Minister (Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s 21; Edwards v Cruickshank (1840) 3 D 282, LP (Hope) at 306; R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, Lord Rodger at para 106). The court had to pronounce an effective remedy, seen in context of the course of conduct complained of, that course indicating that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown would defy the law. A declarator of what the law required was not sufficient because it would appear from that particular course of conduct that members of the UK Government felt that they were above the law, however clear the law may be. The legal duties at issue were clear and unequivocal, yet the Government was said to be looking very carefully at it, and willing to sabotage it, in order for the UK to leave the European Union no matter what the 2019 Act required, if that is thought necessary. Therefore, it could not be presumed, as it normally would be, that the Government would comply with the law when advised of what it required. Against that background, the appropriate remedy was a coercive one in terms of s. 45(b) of the 1988 Act.

12. The petitioners submitted that the respondents’ pleadings did not conform to the requirements of the duty of candour, and there were no supporting affidavits to the effect that what was said on behalf of the respondents was a true, comprehensive and wholly accurate account of Government policy. The petitioners had set out in some detail the various occasions upon which the Prime Minister and/or members of the Government had made statements to the effect that they would not comply with the duties imposed upon the Prime Minister under the 2019 Act. In response, the respondents had suggested that the court could have no regard to the Prime Minister’s statements as to whether or not he would obey the law, insofar as those statements were made in the context of parliamentary debates or answers to Prime Minister’s Questions, due to the operation of parliamentary privilege. Notwithstanding that such statements were subsequently recorded in Hansard and published in newspapers and more widely discussed, somehow the court was to disregard them altogether (see similar arguments ‘rightly rejected’ in Craig v Advocate General for Scotland 2019 SC 230). Article 9 of the English Bill of Rights 1688 did not provide some kind of ‘magic shield’ to the Executive speaking in Parliament, rather it protected the freedom of speech of Members of Parliament. This was affirmed by the UK Supreme Court in Cherry (see, also, Wilson v First Country Trust (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, Toussaint v Attorney-General of St Vincent and the Grenadines [2007] UKPC 48). The contrary argument raised by the respondents was simply unfounded.

13. An affidavit would address the existence of inherent contradiction between the Prime Minister’s statements on some occasions that he would obey the law, and on other occasions that he will not obey the 2019 Act, by providing some kind of explanation. Instead, the respondents’ averments were merely offers to prove matters and not proof in itself. The difficult point was that senior counsel for the petitioners had never seen statements like those contained in Answer 8 for the respondents. The Prime Minister accepted that a letter would be sent in the form required by schedule 1 to the 2019 Act no later than 19 October 2019, but that had never before been said by the Prime Minister. The statements as to what the Prime Minister accepted in relation to the 2019 Act, which were seen by the petitioners for the first time yesterday, were directly contrary to the evidence submitted by the petitioners. Indeed, they were directly contrary to what the Prime Minister had said to Parliament yesterday evening, to the effect that if the EU chose not to show ‘corresponding willingness’ to do a deal, then the UK would have to leave without an agreement and was ready to do so.

14. If the Prime Minister’s position on reflection and having taken legal advice was different, then undertakings to that effect could be given to the court in a form that would reflect the averments contained in Answer 8. The effect would be the same whether an undertaking, interdict or order for specific performance, but the advantage of an undertaking would be that the form could be agreed by the parties and simply accepted by the court. In that event, the court would not be required to pronounce coercive orders to similar effect. However, if the Prime Minister chose to depart from what was merely said by legal representatives in averments made on his behalf, that would not result in the possibility of the court’s contempt jurisdiction coming into play, and the petitioners would be ‘back at square one’ with no effective remedy. The petitioners have a reasonable apprehension that he will do so, on the basis of previous statements by him or on his behalf.

15. The primary purpose was to ensure effective remedy. It was known that breach of undertakings brought into effect the court’s contempt jurisdiction and that it could be prayed in aid against Ministers of the Crown of the UK Government (Beggs v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 3, [2005] CSIH 25). Senior counsel for the petitioners was not aware of any case law to the effect that the contempt jurisdiction could be engaged on the basis of averments subsequently reneged on; it may be, but if there was an equivalence, then where was the harm in giving undertakings so as to avoid any doubt? There was no downside, according to the petitioners. In the absence of an undertaking being offered, however, the court should pronounce such orders as it deemed appropriate to give an effective remedy. It was perhaps sufficient for a formal order to declare that the propositions set out in Answer 8 for the respondents reflected the correct position in law. Whilst no declarator was sought, this did not preclude the court from pronouncing a declarator to that effect, or making such matters plain within the context of its judgment. The petitioners’ primary motion was in terms of the remedies sought under heads (i) and (ii) of the prayer of the petition but the court’s overriding duty was to provide what it considered to be an effective remedy and it may well wish to pronounce a declarator reflecting the terms of Answer 8 in order to confirm that what is said to have been accepted by the Prime Minister in relation to the 2019 Act is, in fact, well founded in law.

16. In order to obtain the remedies sought, the petitioners had to persuade the court on the balance of probabilities as to the binding nature of the statutory duty on the Prime Minister. That appeared to be accepted in terms of the duties described by the respondents in Answer 8. However, the petitioners’ concern was that, in terms of Answer 15, it appeared to be said that whilst the Government was required to obey the law, it was not required to obey the 2019 Act. It was the policy of the Government to ‘give effect to the will of the British people to leave the European Union on 31 October 2019’ and how this could be ‘lawfully achieved’ was a matter for the Government. Those statements would only make sense if appropriate authority was granted to the Government by Parliament as set out in the 2019 Act. Yet there was no admission or statement to the effect that compliance with the 2019 Act meant that it could only be done if and insofar as permitted by Parliament. The 2019 Act made it ‘absolutely explicit’ that the manner in which to leave the EU was a matter for Parliament, not the Government. Accordingly, the respondents had ‘misrepresented’ and ‘misunderstood’ the obligations imposed upon the Government.

17. There was no basis upon which it could be said that Government policy to the contrary effect was not subject to the law. There was no freestanding idea of Government policy that could be achieved unlawfully, and it was the province of the court to affirm that position in relation to the policy of leaving the EU on 31 October without the sanction of Parliament or seeking a change in the law. The respondents’ position was ‘utterly opaque’ and ‘incomprehensible’ in stating that the UK would leave the EU on 31 October without breaching the 2019 Act. Those two statements were contradictory, and the respondents ought not to be allowed to maintain them by way of ‘continued obfuscation’ in order to suggest that, somehow, the law did not apply to this Government or the Prime Minister because it does not agree with policy. There was a constitutional responsibility to maintain the constitution, uphold the rule of law, respect Parliament and comply with the law it has passed, even where the Government disagreed with it (see, eg, Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41 at paras 30 and 61). 18. The repeated statements of the Prime Minister and those who act in and advise his Cabinet were ‘corrosive’ of the duty to uphold the rule of law, respect the constitution, comply with conventions and uphold traditions. These statements were apparently due to partisan interests of Government policy in the face of an ‘inconvenient’ Parliament that disagreed with the Prime Minister. Accordingly, it was important for the court to say ‘enough is enough’ (in the words of the Prime Minister), and to grant coercive orders where no undertakings were offered in order to bring the confusion, misunderstanding and misrepresentation to an end.

19. Those repeated statements formed a clear basis for the petitioners’ apprehension that the Prime Minister would not comply with his duties under the 2019 Act. The averments set out in Answer 8 were not sufficient to give comfort or allow the court to consider those apprehensions to be unreasonable. In particular, the ‘anti-frustration’ order was required precisely because none of the statements issued in the name of the Prime Minister had been disavowed. The petitioners produced an affidavits to this effect, including references to the content of relevant newspaper reports, and an interview by the Prime Minister on the Andrew Marr Show on 29 September 2019, suggesting that it was Government policy to sabotage and frustrate the purpose of the 2019 Act. Also cited by the petitioners were the Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons on 3 October 2019 (to the effect that the UK had to leave the EU on 31 October without an agreement and was ready to do so), and his speech to the Conservative Party conference, in which readiness and willingness to leave the EU on 31 October ‘come what may’ was expressed.

Submissions on behalf of the respondents

20. On behalf of the respondents, the court was invited to refuse the orders sought at this hearing and to refuse the petition. The court would be entitled to refuse for want of insistence the remaining orders which the petitioners sought to be ‘held over’. Alternatively, the petition ought to be refused for the sole reason that there was no reasonable apprehension of illegality.

21. On the question of jurisdiction, the respondents had expressly acknowledged that the court has jurisdiction insofar as the petition proceeded against the Prime Minister as the holder of that office. The respondents had merely sought to deal with the averments made against them, in which the petitioners had sought to ‘run two horses’ by proceeding against the Prime Minister as an individual and separately as an office holder. The respondents’ position reflects their acceptance that the Prime Minister was accountable as an office holder but not as an individual. The statute required the Prime Minister from time to time to do certain acts, and was not directed against Mr Johnson personally, contrary to certain of the petitioners’ averments that appeared to be directed against him personally. Accordingly, it was admitted that the court has jurisdiction insofar as the proceedings were directed against Ministers of the Crown.

22. As to competency, it was pars judicis [the court’s duty] to have regard to questions of competency. The respondents sought to assist the court in understanding the preliminary point said to arise. In short, section 45(b) of the Court of Session Act 1988 provides that the court may, ‘on application by summary petition’ order the specific performance of any statutory duty. The question arises: what is a summary petition, not being defined in the Act or elsewhere in the Rules of Court? Having regard to Chapter 58 of the Rules of the Court of Session (RCS), in particular rules 58.1 and 58.2, an application to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court “includes” (rather than “including”, as it was worded prior to 22 September 2015) an application made under section 45(b) of the 1988 Act. The plain reading of the rule was that an application to the supervisory jurisdiction includes applications under s. 45(b) and, in terms of rule 58.1(2), such an application ‘must’ be made by petition for judicial review. That was significant because, if incompetently raised, it could not be cured by the court because specific rules dealt with transfers to and from judicial review procedure (rules 58.15 and 58.16), transfer ‘to’ judicial review procedure being limited to ‘actions’. A petition was, of course, not an action. Whilst the Rules of Court referred to ‘causes’, which were any proceedings in the court, a distinction was drawn between petitions and actions. The present case not being an ‘action’, rule 58.15 could not be prayed in aid to cure the incompetency. Moreover, the existence of a specific provision for the transfer of ‘actions’ and not ‘petitions’ to judicial review procedure, it would not be appropriate to use any other provision in the rules to do so.

23. The case of McKenzie v Scottish Ministers (supra), viewed in its proper context, referred to the wording of the relevant rules as at 2004 – notably “including” rather than the much more categorical word “includes” referred to above. The observations of Lord Carloway, sitting in a Lord Ordinary in that case, were, in any event, obiter and qualified to the effect that they did not amount to the expression of a concluded view. in that context, Lord Carloway was clearly trying to explain his concerns and justify them against the particular wording of the rule then in force. The different wording of the current rule tended to suggest a departure from the apprehension expressed in that case. Applying the rule in its current form, it states expressly that the application under section 45(b) ought to have been raised under the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. It hasn’t been, therefore it is incompetent.

24. Further, at common law, judicial review required individuals to perform statutory duties (see, eg, West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385, LP (Hope) at 412-413; and Forbes v Underwood (1886) 13 R 465, in respect of the court’s ‘supereminent jurisdiction’, cited in West at 399). Where a private individual performed functions entrusted to them, a claim in respect of failure to perform that duty had to be brought by judicial review, whether under common law or statute. Otherwise, it would be rather odd if the nature of the remedy was defined by whether a statutory or non-statutory duty was sought to be enforced. If the respondents’ interpretation were correct, then the same procedure applied in either case. Whether by contract or statute, an obligation to determine something was secured by application the court’s supervisory jurisdiction (see, eg, Watt v Strathclyde Regional Council 1992 SLT 324, cited in West at 411). The example, posited by the court, of the enforcement against a company of a statutory duty under health and safety legislation to provide certain facilities for its employees, such as by a trade union, also had to be done by judicial review. Accordingly, the reasoning of Lord Carloway in McKenzie was misconceived, at least as the relevant rule of court presently exists. The same ‘degree of flexibility of construction’ was no longer open to the court in construing RCS Chapter 58.

25. The respondents could not assist the court as to why the particular change had been effected. However, the court had now provided in its rules that, provided there is a statutory component, even in the case of an otherwise private dispute, enforcement must be by way of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session. The respondents agreed with the proposition, ventured by the court, that the view appeared to have been taken that the performance of a statutory duty as envisaged in section 45(b) of the 1988 Act had a public law dimension to it, whereas section 45(a) did not, and was therefore excluded. This was said to be consistent with the requisite tripartite relationship inherent in judicial review disputes. In any event, the competency point was a relevant one and had to be addressed. Accordingly, the respondents invited the plea to be sustained, leaving only the question of interdict to be determined.

26. The Advocate General’s remaining submissions related, broadly, to (i) whether in fact there were reasonable grounds of apprehension that a legal wrong may occur in the future; (ii) whether interdicts were sufficiently specific to be enforceable; and (iii) whether implement was justified on its terms, or was premature. However, the question of ‘reasonable grounds’ was said to be the primary question in these proceedings. 27. The petitioners had made reference to a number of matters, some of which pre-dated the 2019 Act and were therefore of questionable value or materiality in assessing the intention of the Prime Minister to comply with its terms. The petitioners also referred to statements of others, for which the Prime Minister could not be held responsible, or statements that were simply unattributed. There was now a ‘clear statement’ as to what the Government will do in terms of the requirements of the 2019 Act, which has been put on record so that there can be no doubt. Those averments were made on clear and carefully considered instructions, and were averments made by a Law Officer of the Crown who was also an Officer of the Court. That ‘peculiar juxtaposition of responsibilities’ was said to underlie the respect that was traditionally given to representations made by the Law Officers, whether in written answers or in oral statements in court. The answers were lodged on behalf of the Advocate General, on behalf of UK Government, including the Prime Minister in his official capacity. Indeed, in the European framework, ‘article 50 communications’ were conducted through the UK Government and that was the framework within which the 2019 Act operated insofar as the request for an extension of time was made by the Government. Accordingly, the claim fell to be judged on the basis of what was stated in the answers to the petition, and the court should place ‘significant and conclusive weight’ on the statements that had been made. The position of the Prime Minister could not be clearer in terms of the express obligations to be complied with no later than 19 October under the 2019 Act. Those statements effectively answered the concerns in the petition.

28. There was no requirement for the same statements to be converted into an undertaking to the court, albeit that the petitioners may be satisfied by that. There were two components to the statements made – first, that there would be compliance with the clear provisions of the 2019 Act, and secondly, that there was a recognition of the requirement to comply with the ‘anti-frustration’ principle. The statements of recognition and compliance appeared to be adequate to deal with the petitioners’ apprehensions. Nonetheless, it was simply unnecessary to give any undertaking in those terms. Nor would it add anything to that which had already been identified in the pleadings. The court was entitled to ‘take extra comfort’ in the knowledge that not only was there an ability to hold private litigants to account on their pleadings, particularly if presented directly to address an issue upon which the court relied, but also that the party in question was an Officer of the Court and a Law Officer of the Crown. The court would deal with any question of contempt just as it might deal with a litigant giving evidence, and there was no reason for the position to be any different in the case of a party adopting a particular argument in law and then departing from it.

29. The court was entitled to look at the body of material produced, and if the question was of the balancing of weight, the weight of the other material did not go anywhere near the weight of the clear position adopted in the pleadings. It was inappropriate to draw an adverse inference from the failure to provide an undertaking where there was no compulsion or obligation on anyone to do so. No weight could be attached to such a factor, particularly where the explanation had been given that it was thought to be unnecessary as the position had been stated to the court in the pleadings. These were judicial review proceedings, in which parties’ positions were ordinarily stated in this way, unlike civil actions for damages where issues turned on matters of evidence. Nonetheless, it was part of the totality of the picture that it was the policy of the Government to give effect to the referendum vote and exit the EU on 31 October 2019.

30. It was well known that the 2019 Act was not a Government Bill; that there was Government opposition to the extension sought in the 2019 Act; that the Government position was to leave on 31 October. Those were all factors in assessing the weight to be attached to the statements in question. It had to be borne in mind that the statements relied upon by the petitioners were only part of the picture. The respondents had also lodged an inventory of documents containing other statements where the Prime Minister and other Ministers had identified that the Government would comply with the law. The Government was conducting its negotiations [with the EU], which to all intents and purposes appeared to have come to a halt, but the events of the last 24 – 48 hours had demonstrated a re-engagement [by the EU] on the withdrawal issues. The Government was entitled, so long as did so in accordance with the law, to take whatever position it wished to advance such negotiations. Statements had been made in order to make the Government’s policy and intent clear, and it did so in order to be effective and to appear to be effective. As and when acceptable changes were made to the proposed withdrawal agreement, it would be brought back to Parliament in order to provide the Government with the necessary legal authority to proceed. The issue had been focussed in these proceedings, and that was why the position was now clearly stated. The conduct of negotiations was as much a matter of what was not said, as well as what was said. The Government ought to be entitled to conduct negotiations on that basis, free from having to give an undertaking to the court, which may itself affect negotiations.

31. It would be odd if the Prime Minister was not entitled to the same protection as other Members of Parliament arising from parliamentary privilege. Matters covered by parliamentary privilege could not be used by the petitioners to ‘make their point’; parliamentary statements could not be used to ‘make argument’. They could be observed, and reference could be made to them in order to identify issues of fact, but they could not be used to advance argument as was done here by the petitioners. They may provide factual background to policy, such as in the example posited by the court of ministerial statements relied upon in the interpretation of legislative provisions, but that did not necessarily indicate that they could be relied upon for the purposes of advancing argument. That may be a fine distinction, but it was a distinction nonetheless.

32. In adherence to the principle that parliamentary privilege applied, the respondents had not included a further schedule of parliamentary statements by the Prime Minister and other Ministers. It was not considered by the respondents to be appropriate to do so, but could be provided if the court considered it appropriate to do so. In any event, it remained appropriate to understand the context in which the statements were made, namely that the Government was seeking to achieve the result of leaving the EU on 31 October, and to do that enter a withdrawal agreement, and to do that take a [negotiating] line. Nothing was being said that was inconsistent with the Government’s desire to achieve a withdrawal agreement, so that the UK can leave, and will leave, on 31 October.

33. With regard to the terms of the interdict sought, the respondents submitted that some questions of specification arose. In any event, it would be quite inappropriate, bearing in mind that the Government was conducting negotiations, for the court to ‘in effect enter the negotiating arena’ by saying what could and could not be done. If the Government accepted the ‘no-frustration principle’, and accepted that it applied, it was ‘potentially destructive’ of its negotiating position if its hands were effectively tied by undertakings. The position set out in Answer 8 did not tie its hands, and that was why it was presented in that way, as to not tie the hands of Government in its negotiations. Even something as simple as the court expecting, and the Government therefore giving, an undertaking may be constructed in a manner affecting the Government’s position in negotiations.

34. The primary question was whether the court took the view that there was a reasonable apprehension that a legal wrong was likely to occur, standing what was said in the pleadings, and how the respondents submitted that the other material ought to be viewed. The respondents submitted that that the court could not take the view in light of the entire material that there was such a reasonable apprehension.

35. The respondents acceded to the view, posited by the court, to the effect that all statements had been said in a political context, and that was the ‘admirably succinct’ (rather than ‘opaque’ as suggested by senior counsel for the petitioners) qualification expressly set out in Answer 15. The manner in which the policy was ‘lawfully achieved’ was a matter for the Government, negotiations in the international sphere were a matter for the Government, and it was not for the court to impose conditions thereon. Subject to the 2019 Act, and the ‘frustration principle’, both of which the Government had clearly acknowledged in Answer 8, there could not be rationally concluded that there was a reasonable apprehension of wrong, notwithstanding anything that had been said in past.

36. The respondents had no difficulty with the court saying that the orders sought by the petitioners were refused on the basis of the averments made by respondents. That was why the averments had been made, to make the position clear to the court, so that the court could rely on that position, both in terms of compliance with the strict wording of the 2019 Act, and the freedom to negotiate going forward in the knowledge that the terms of 2019 Act exist. To that extent, declarator would be the appropriate remedy. To go further would be to exceed the proper judicial function in the delicate context of international functions that were traditionally outwith the scope of the court to interfere. The Government would continue to be advised on the lawfulness of their proposed actions, and it would be inappropriate to impose further specific requirements, which may only frustrate the ability of Government to conduct negotiations. Such a result would be ‘disappointing’ insofar as the Government’s approach appeared to have achieved some movement [from the EU].

37. With regard to the order sought for implement, a number of fundamental difficulties arose. First, the order innovated on the requirements of the 2019 Act both as regards the ‘trigger’ and time for compliance. The 2019 Act permitted up to the end of 19 October 2019, yet the petitioners required things to be done by 11pm on 18 October and 3pm on 19 October. The respondents were at a loss as to the basis for any such requirements. The 2019 Act required the relevant letter to be sent, and no more, whereas the order sought further steps to be taken and was not specific enough to be enforceable, particularly at risk of penalties being sought for non-compliance.

38. In any event, such an order could not be sought unless there had been a breach of duty. There could be no prospect of failure to comply until after 19 October 2019. The 2019 Act recognised that nothing required to be done before then, and it might be the case that nothing required to be done thereafter. An apprehended breach of statutory duty was not sufficient as the basis for an order under section 45(b) of the 1988 Act. It provided for specific performance, and therefore required something to be done, rather than a declaration that something ought to be done. It provided for an order to be granted where there had been non-compliance. If the duty was yet to be implemented, there could not be non-compliance. The court would be wrong to order specific performance until such time as performance could be achieved. Until such time, how could the court know that the duty would not be performed? Even after assessment of the evidence, the court would still be left with a period of time during which the duty could be complied with, and so the court could not act before non-compliance had occurred. Accordingly, the remedy ought not to be granted and, in any event, it was unnecessary.

39. Separately, the person obliged to act was the Prime Minister, therefore getting someone else to do it would be beyond the statutory obligation (as the terms of the interdict sought to address ‘anybody acting on their behalf of at their request’).

Petitioners’ reply

40. In a brief reply, the petitioners made reference to, and produced to the court, a press release by a No. 10 Downing Street source, published on the BBC website, apparently in response to documents published by the Scottish court, to the effect that the Government would comply with the 2019 Act, but that the Act imposed only a ‘narrow duty’ to send a letter and it could be interpreted in different ways and did not prevent the Government from doing other things that do not cause delay. The Government was said to be making its true position on delay known privately in Europe, and that its position would become public soon. The petitioners submitted that this appeared to be ‘undercutting’ the previous understanding of Answer 8, that the Prime Minister accepted that he was subject to the public law principle that he could not frustrate the purpose or provisions of the 2019 Act. It appeared to be thought, instead, that the ‘frustration principle’ related only to a very specific narrow duty concerning the letter requesting delay.

41. The petitioners submitted that this was a ‘rather peculiar and unsustainable’ interpretation. The interdict had been set out in the petition in order to avoid that kind of ‘spin’, ‘misunderstanding’ and ‘misrepresentation of the law’, which was said by the respondents to be necessary in order for the Government to conduct negotiations. The respondents had not suggested that the specific examples of frustration set out there were not proper examples of how the principle would apply. It was precisely because of evidence to the effect that it would be interpreted incredibly narrowly that the petitioners had set out precise examples of threatened action that would in fact be contrary to the ‘frustration principle’. Accordingly, coercive orders were required.

42. The respondents’ ‘real defence’ seemed to be that, if orders were pronounced in the manner sought, this would tie the hands of the Government in negotiations. However, the Prime Minister had deliberately said that he will obey the law but will not obey the 2019 Act. Accordingly, the petitioners required an effective remedy to protect constitution and uphold rule of law.

43. Whilst it was suggested that the proceedings ought to have been raised by judicial review, the basic point was that an Act of Sederunt, made by delegated power, could only alter procedural matters and could not change the substance of the law as to the supervisory jurisdiction (Taylor v Marshalls Food Group (No 2) 1998 SC 841). The present application was clearly not an application to the supervisory jurisdiction (Doherty v Scottish Ministers 2012 SC 150; Ruddy v Chief Constable, Strathclyde 2013 SC (UKSC) 126). The complaint that it had to be brought by way of an application for judicial review was simply unsustainable, apart from RCS Chapter 58, which had to be subordinated to section 45(b) of the 1988 Act.

44. A reasonable apprehension was clearly sufficient basis to make an order under section 45(b), as was apparent from the following section 46, which allowed that an order for specific performance may be granted in the same circumstances as the court may grant interdict. The court may also grant interim orders regulating the subject matter of the petition. Given that interdict and interim interdict could be granted on the basis of reasonable apprehension, the same applied to positive orders under sections 45 and 46. Any suggestion otherwise was simply unsustainable.

45. Finally, there was absolutely no basis for the claim that something put in pleadings on behalf of the Advocate General had conclusive weight to outweigh such a reasonable apprehension. Therefore, the petitioners renewed the motion made at the outset of proceedings.

The court made avizandum and indicated that judgment would be issued on Monday.

United Kingdom Supreme Court Appeal Judgment

Date 24 Sep 2019

Neutral citation number [2019] UKSC 41

Case ID UKSC 2019/0193

Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland
Miller v Prime Minister


(1) the Prime Minister’s accountability to Parliament did not in itself justify the conclusion that the courts have no legitimate role to play because the effect of prorogation was to prevent the operation of ministerial accountability to Parliament during the period when Parliament stood prorogued and because the courts had a duty to give effect to the law irrespective of the Prime Minister’s political accountability to Parliament (para 33);

(2) if the issue before the court was justiciable, deciding it would give effect to the separation of powers by ensuring that the Government did not use prorogation unlawfully with the effect of preventing Parliament from carrying out its proper functions (para 34)

(3) a distinction was to be drawn between (first) the existence and extent of a prerogative power existed and (second) whether the exercise of an existing prerogative within its limits was open to legal challenge on some other basis, with questions arising under the first issue always being justiciable (paras 35-36);

(4) prerogative powers were limited by the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty (that laws enacted by the Crown in Parliament are the supreme form of law in our legal system) (para 41);

(5) an unlimited power of prorogation would incompatible with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, as then the executive could prevent Parliament from exercising its legislative authority for as long as it pleased (paras 42, 44);

(6) prorogation that had the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive would be unlawful, and the court would intervene if the effect was sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course (para 50)

(7) the Prime Minister’s action had the effect of frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the Government to account, where it prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional role for five out of a possible eight weeks between the end of the summer recess and exit day on the 31st October, a date when a fundamental change was due to take place (paras 55-57);

(8) there was no justification for the prorogation lasting five weeks, as the unchallenged evidence of former Prime Minister Sir John Major was that the typical time required for preparation of a Queen’s Speech was four to six days, and there was no reason given in the Government’s minutes for a prorogation of such length, there being no hint there that the Prime Minister was acting as someone with a constitutional responsibility to have regard to the interests of Parliament rather than simply the leader of the Government seeking to promote its own policies (paras 30, 58-62);

(9) Parliamentary privilege did not preclude the court holding that the act of prorogation itself (rather than simply the advice to Her Majesty to prorogue) was unlawful as the prorogation was not a proceeding of Parliament, where it was imposed from outside rather than debated and voted upon by Members of Parliament, and was not the core and essential business of Parliament given that it brought that business to an end (para 68);

(10) the prorogation was of no lawful effect and it was not necessary for Parliament to be recalled as Parliament had not been prorogued (paras 69-7),

and appeal in Cherry refused and in Miller allowed

Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland

The following is a summary of the oral submissions at the hearing of the petitioners’ reclaiming motion (appeal) on Thursday and Friday, 5 and 6 September 2019, prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance.

The matter was heard by the First Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Edinburgh, comprising the Lord President (Lord Carloway), Lord Brodie, and Lord Drummond Young.

Preliminary Matters

Application by petitioners in respect of the production of unredacted documents

1. The petitioners (represented by Aidan O’Neill QC, and David Welsh, Advocate) moved that the respondent should be ordered to produce in court, and to the parties, in unredacted form, the documents produced and relied upon before the Lord Ordinary (Lord Doherty) in support of their claims as to the reasonableness and constitutionality of the decision to order prorogation. The documents had been produced in redacted form, apparently on the basis of (a) relevance, (b) legal professional privilege, and (c) the Law Officers’ convention. It was not known what lay behind those redactions, or whether or not the claims were properly made. Notably, however, no claim of public interest immunity had been made. If legal professional privilege were to be claimed in support of any redactions, that ought to have been done in these proceedings by way of affidavit evidence. The annotated rules of court indicated that affidavits were ‘extensively used’ in judicial review in Scotland.

2. In support of the motion, the petitioners’ basic proposition was that, having lodged those documents, the respondent could not come to this court with ‘edited highlights’ in breach of the basic principles of fairness, fair trial and open justice (Scottish Lion Insurance Co Ltd v Goodrich Corp 2011 SC 534, Opinion of the Court delivered by Lord Reed at para 48). By lodging the documents, the respondent had waived any privilege in relation to their contents by the manner and purpose for which they had been produced. Accordingly, the respondent ought to be ordered to produce the documents in unredacted form as fairness required. Otherwise, the court would have to be persuaded in respect of the basis of any redactions sought. The respondent, having failed to follow the proper procedures, ought to be required to produce the full unredacted documents to the court and parties (Somerville v Scottish Ministers 2008 SC (HL) 45, Lord Rodger at para 155). Any application to maintain privilege would now be too late and would be incompetent as a matter of Scots law (Glasgow Corp v Central Land Board 1956 SC (HL) 1, Viscount Simonds at 9). Even in matters of some constitutional moment, the Scots law position was different and, in a Scottish appeal, ought to prevail such that the court was entitled to gainsay any claims by the Crown as to what was required in the public interest.

3. The respondent (represented by David Johnston QC, and Andrew Webster QC) resisted the motion on precisely the suggested ground, in order for the court to be able to assess whether the Lord Ordinary had fallen into error on the material before him. The respondent emphasised that the documents had been produced in order to comply with the duty of candour to the court to make disclosure of documents but that, given the respondent’s claim that the case raised non-justiciable matters, the reasons contained in those documents were not germane to the principal issue. The Lord Ordinary had made it clear that his decision rested fundamentally on non-justiciability. In any event, senior counsel for the respondent, having had sight of the documents, was willing to state on his own responsibility that the redactions had been properly made for the reasons given, namely relevance, legal professional privilege, and the Law Officers’ convention.

4. The respondent’s reasons emerged sufficiently for the court to take a view and scrutinise them to the extent that it might regard as appropriate. Furthermore, there was no need for the petitioners to see any further or unredacted version of the documents insofar as it was argued that the court ought to disregard them as unsupported by affidavit evidence. In any event, as a matter of principle, it was extremely important that the redactions remained in place in order not to cause difficulty to the ordinary business of Government. If the Government could not be assured that advice could be redacted on the grounds of legal professional privilege, that was potentially a great inroad into how it could conduct its business and whether it could continue to do so in the way it currently did.

5. The petitioners’ application ought to have been made before the Lord Ordinary, and this court had no need to look at material that was unavailable to him. Otherwise, further submissions ought to be allowed in respect of the appropriate procedure for redactions to be considered.

6. The Lord President observed that, as a matter of procedure, the appeal hearing would generally proceed upon the basis of the documents that had been before the court at first instance. Following brief deliberations, however, the court observed that, having had very little time to consider the content of the relevant documents, it would continue consideration of whether to order production of the documents in unredacted form at the conclusion of substantive arguments (see further below: Application by BBC and others).

Application by BBC and others in respect of access to court documents

7. Counsel for the BBC (Kenneth McBrearty QC) moved the court to consider a fresh application to intervene in the proceedings on behalf of the BBC and also the publishers of The Times and The Scottish Sun solely for the purpose of seeking access to various documents referred to by counsel in argument before the Lord Ordinary.

8. In any event, the applicants sought to intervene on that discrete issue alone, and to obtain access to the petition and answers as adjusted and the written intervention by the Lord Advocate. Whilst access had been sought on a voluntary basis, all parties had indicated no objection, except the respondent. Access was sought on the basis of the principle of open justice at common law, one of the main purposes of which was to allow the public to understand how the justice system worked, the arguments made in court, and the reasons for any decisions taken. In the present case, the proceedings were self-evidently of the utmost public interest. The proceedings before the Lord Ordinary had been ‘live streamed’ on the BBC website, and its news page containing a link to the relevant stream had received over 1.2 million ‘hits’. In matters of such great public interest, which stimulated such enormous public debate, it was right that the public should understand and be fully informed. The documents having been lodged and referred to in open court, the applicants were impeded from reporting fully and precisely what was being argued (see, eg, Opinion of Lord Doherty at para 34, which was understood to be a reference to the documents to which access was sought). In essence, if the applicants wished to scrutinise the Lord Ordinary’s reasoning and report on that to the public, they required full access to the documents seen by the Lord Ordinary. Whilst excerpts had been read out in court, that had been done only to the extent thought appropriate by counsel for the petitioners, whereas far more was available to the court. Moreover, whilst the Lord Ordinary had referred to the documents in the contexts of a ‘fallback’ argument, their relevance or otherwise was nothing to the point. The principle of open justice was concerned with permitting the public to understand what had been said and argued, and the issues before the court. It remained relevant for the public to understand the argument and the determination made, even in respect of a fallback position. The default position was that the public should have access to any documents lodged and referred to in court, particularly where there were proper journalistic reasons for seeking access as there were in the present circumstances (see, eg, Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd v Dring [2019] UKSC 38; R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2013] QB 618). The court was required to carry out a balancing exercise to weigh up the advancement of open justice against any harm that may ensue as a result of access being granted. Where the default position favoured the applicants, however, the court ought to entertain the application and hear from the respondent as to what, if anything ought to be considered in the balance.

9. It would be curious if the principle of open justice required the media to await the outcome of the case in order to assess whether the court considered the documents to be relevant, and allowed access only if relevant. In that event, public access would be circumscribed by the court’s view of the case or, perhaps more insidious still, the manner in which the Government presented its arguments to the court, thereby dictating access to the material relied upon. Whether or not the documents were ultimately found to be relevant was of no consequence. Once the documents had been referred to in open court, the applicants were entitled to understand their context and the reasons why they had been referred to. The respondent had lodged the documents in a redacted form on the basis that the remainder was appropriate to be lodged and made available to the parties. It was difficult to see how it could impede good government to have it properly explained to the public what the Government relied upon in arguing that there were proper reasons for the prorogation of Parliament. In any event, the present case was plainly unique. The applicants did not seek to establish any kind of general rule for access to Cabinet documents. The Government having taken the decision to lodge the documents, they had unsurprisingly been referred to in open court and the applicants merely sought a decision in respect of access to those documents on the particular facts of the case. The principle of open justice plainly outweighed any considerations on the other side of balance.

10. The applicants further sought the court’s permission to have sight of the parties’ written notes of argument before this court, the respondent having been requested but unwilling to produce his note voluntarily. The purpose of the notes was, in effect, to take the place of oral argument before the court, and was subject to the principle of open justice as part of those arguments. It was not clear what would be said by the respondent about the documents in which the applicants were interested, but the applicants ought to have the opportunity to consider anything said in order to inform the submissions that may be made in due course.

11. The respondent did not deny the applicants’ right to ask the court for access to the documents, but submitted that it did not follow that access ought to be granted. The court required to carry out a fact-specific balancing exercise with regard to the potential value of the items in promoting open justice as against the potential harm to the effectiveness of the judicial process occasioned by their disclosure. A range of diverse interests could weigh on the other side of the balance, such as national security, children, trade secrets, and commercial confidentiality, against facilitating the understanding of court proceedings. In the present case, there was a concern that documents consisting of Cabinet minutes and advice to Ministers were components of Cabinet confidentiality which were, in turn, features of the collective responsibility of Government as an integral part of the UK democratic tradition. It was necessary to ensure that they remained confidential insofar as possible in order to maintain effective governance, otherwise such documents would have to be drafted in future with a view to publication, which may cause them to be less candid. Moreover, guidance would have to be produced across Government departments, especially where the duty of candour in any particular case might lead to documents becoming more widely available to the public. In any event, the Lord Ordinary had rejected matters in the present case as non-justiciable, therefore the documents were not part of the ratio of the decision, which weighed against their release to the applicants as a requirement of open justice. The relevance of the documents remained to be determined, and at the very least those documents ought to remain in court and confined to the parties until their true relevance was known.

12. With regard to notes of argument, the respondent had offered sight of the note of argument to counsel for the BBC and other media organisations on a ‘counsel to counsel’ basis, and it was not clear why this had not been sufficient for the stated purpose of understanding the respondent’s arguments before the court. The applicants were not party to the proceedings and it had been a reasonable offer, although it could not be said that there was something contained in the note that the respondent really did not wish to be seen.

13. The Lord President observed that the court was not persuaded that this would be an intervention, given that no involvement in the substantive hearing was intended, rather it was merely an application. It was further observed that, as a generality, the petition and answers as adjusted by the parties, and the written intervention of the Lord Advocate, would be publicly available in any reclaiming motion.

14. It was further observed that, conscious of the need for open justice, the court would normally act in accordance with that principle unless there were good reasons to the contrary. No order was required in order for access to be granted to the petition and answers as adjusted, and the written intervention of the Lord Advocate, and the court would provide copies of those documents. However, a decision in respect of the Cabinet documents would be delayed until the end of proceedings.

15. At the close of the first day of the appeal proceedings, after brief deliberations, the court held that the press ought to have access to the written arguments to be developed in oral submissions before the court. There was no need for a formal order in this regard, and the court would provide copies.

16. The three documents lodged by the respondent and referred to extensively by the parties should also be made available – in their redacted form – so that the precise terms would be known to those listening to the debate and there would be no error in relation to what precisely they said. The court so ordered in relation to those documents.

Submissions on behalf of the petitioners

17. The petitioners adopted their note of argument in the reclaiming motion and written response to the note of argument for the respondent. In summary, the rule of law and the principle of equality before the law meant that legal duties could be enforced by order of the court against the Executive, such as to submit for Royal Assent any Bill which had duly passed through Parliament. If the Executive failed, refused or delayed to present any such Bill for Royal Assent, the courts could, and had to, intervene, in order to uphold the rule of law (see, eg, (Barclay v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014 UKSC 41, [2015] AC 276; Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458).

18. In deciding the present appeal, it was submitted that the court had to take full and proper account of the Scottish constitutional traditions. There was no automaticity of replacement of Scots law in respect of Crown rights and prerogatives as a result of the Union (Admiralty v Blair’s Trustees 1916 SC 247; Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32). The Claim of Right 1689 sets out, not just that Parliament should be frequently called, but that it should be allowed to sit for the redress of all grievances and remedy of the law. It was directed specifically to the power of prorogation, and outlawed the abuse of that power: if that power was exercised for improper purposes, or because it was vitiated by error of law or was otherwise unreasonable in its exercise, that would constitute going beyond the limits which the law allowed. The courts would recognise abuse when they saw it.

19. The petitioners submitted that the Lord Ordinary erred on the issue of justiciability, as it was argued before him. In effect, his decision was that, when it came to prorogation, the Executive was above the law. If the Executive chose to use that power, for whatever purpose it wished, and for however long it wished, the courts could do nothing about it because there were no justiciable standards by which to determine whether the power was lawfully being used or unlawfully being abused. That was wrong, and an abdication of the constitutional function of the court to ensure that the rule of law was maintained. The power of prorogation was a residual power in the hands of the Executive, by which it could suspend the sitting of Parliament. In a constitution characterised, not just by the rule of law but by the sovereignty of the legislature, the idea that the Executive could suspend the legislature had to be seen as a very narrow and wholly specific possibility, which the Executive might exercise only for good and proper reason, only at a proper time, and only for the shortest possible period. Otherwise, there was no sovereignty of Parliament; rather there would be sovereignty of the Executive. On the Lord Ordinary’s reading, however, the Executive could say that Parliament, having been elected, was rather getting in the way of an optimistic, forward-looking legislative programme and so should be suspended for the next year, or two years, or three. There would be nothing to stop elections taking place once every four years, and Parliament simply being prorogued meantime. That, however, would be absurd and unconstitutional, and would amount to dictatorship. If Parliament had no power to stop itself from being prorogued upon the exercise of prerogative power by the Executive, then who guarded the holder of that power and prevented its abuse? The answer was, the court. It was the court’s fundamental role in constitutional issues of this type to ensure the balance of power and mutuality of respect amongst the three pillars of state, namely the Executive, legislature and courts. Otherwise, the courts were powerless to respond to unconstitutionality, which was plainly wrong.

20. As soon as it was accepted that the court had a role, that the power of prorogation was limited and governed by law and could not be used for improper purposes or otherwise abused, then the courts were able to tell the Executive when it had erred. That was the purpose of judicial review. The courts recognised and respected the acts of the Executive when carried out within their proper sphere, but the courts determined the limits and proper sphere within which those powers could be exercised, and enforced its view by pronouncing appropriate remedies.

21. None of the cases relied upon by the respondent were relevant to the issue of prorogation, and the proposition that the matter was not justiciable (as to which the Lord Ordinary had been persuaded) was simply unsustainable, because it was unconstitutional. The petitioners invited the court to treat the respondent’s submissions in this regard with ‘extreme caution’.

22. Not since the 17th century had the power of prorogation been ‘so nakedly abused’, resulting in the Claim of Right 1689. The court was required to interpret those legislative provisions and apply them to the circumstances of the present case. According to the distinctive Scottish tradition, that the King could always be called to answer before the courts, the precise wording differed from that of the Bill of Rights 1688 – notably, that Parliament be ‘allowed to sit’ once summoned, and therefore ought not to be prorogued if it would be contrary to its constitutional duty to ‘redress all grievances’ and preserve the law. Such ‘constitutional instruments’ (R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport: re HS2 [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324) were not ‘black letter taxing statutes’, rather they set out principles intended to be applied across the ages and their words ought to be interpreted against the historical and traditional background of the principles embodied. The meaning was ‘absolutely clear’ – that a legally limited monarchy was not to be transformed be ‘evil and wicked counsellors’ into an ‘arbitrary despotic power’. It did not take much imagination or interpretation to apply those words to the circumstances of the present day. In the modern day, despite having no majority of any sort, the Government sought to dominate Parliament by seeking to exercise its powers outside Parliament in order to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.

23. The sovereignty of Parliament was a fundamental principle of the UK constitution (R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262, Lord Bingham at para 9). Whilst the Lord Ordinary appeared to have some difficulty with the petitioners’ formulation of the point, it entailed that Parliament decided on the allocation of prerogative powers. It was entirely a matter for Parliament to confer particular powers on the Executive, if it so wished, by statute. The fact that it chose not to do so in any particular situation simply meant that it had decided for the moment to leave that specific power with the Executive. Indeed, Parliament had removed the power to dissolve Parliament and to call a general election whenever it suited the Executive to do so, in terms of the rules now set down in the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011. The interpretation of those rules in legislation was a matter for the courts. In any event, it could not be said that there could be no objection to a refusal by the Government to call an election after five years, or to dissolve Parliament for six or seven years, on the basis that the matter was not justiciable. The Executive had to be held to account if it breached the law, and its exercise of prerogative power could be challenged on the basis of improper or arbitrary use (Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508, Lord Parmoor at 567-8).

24. Upon questioning by Lord Brodie as to whether it was the petitioners’ position that an exercise of the prerogative power would always be justiciable, the petitioners argued that it was the exercise of this prerogative power – the specific power to prorogue – in the circumstances of this case that was justiciable. The respondent had to be able to vouch the contrary, notwithstanding the terms of the Claim of Right 1689. In any event, it was contrary to constitutional principle that prorogation would always be non-justiciable – the fact that it had been abused in the past, and was being abused now, attracted justiciability.

25. The principle of Parliamentary accountability was also important. Whilst the Executive was politically accountable to Parliament, the power to suspend Parliament impeded that constitutional check and balance of accountability, specifically in relation to discussions and negotiations with EU institutions. To suspend Parliament in the knowledge that the most crucial thing happening was a potential fundamental constitutional shift as a result of the UK exiting from the EU, was to try to hide from constitutional accountability. That was precisely an abuse of power, unconstitutional, and could be declared unlawful by this court.

26. That said, political and legal accountability were not mutually exclusive, and could overlap (R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor (No 2), supra). The case of Barclay was said to be a ‘strong case’ in favour of the petitioners, as jurisdiction and justiciability were asserted in the plainest terms, albeit that the decision on the facts was, in essence, that the UK courts were forum non conveniens.

27. The Executive was obliged to obey the law, and it was for the courts to enforce the rule of law by providing the necessary remedies, including judicial review on the ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety of the use of prerogative powers for legislative functions (Edwards v Cruickshank (1840) 3 D 282, LP Hope at 306; R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453, Lord Rodger at para 106; Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458, Lord Diplock at 473). The law got ‘to the very heart of advice’ to the sovereign as whether or not to do something, if that was what was required, and justiciability was ‘so completely established’ that there could be little argument about it. The Executive’s power was not limited or unfettered, and this was an affirmation of justiciability (R (Sandiford) v Foreign Secretary [2014] UKSC 44, [2014] 1 WLR 2697 at paras 50, 52, 65). The exercise of the power of prorogation would be lawful only if consistent with constitutional principle (Prof Paul Craig, ‘Prorogation Constitutional Principle and Law, Fact and Causation’, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 31 August 2019).

28. There was no sworn evidence from the Prime Minister in the present case who, as the decision maker, had a duty candidly to disclose his reasons in an Affidavit, subject to the possibility of cross-examination or consideration of a charge of perjury insofar as those reasons contained anything other than an accurate and complete account of the decision to prorogue. Nor were there Affidavits produced by any others who were apparently closely involved, according to the documents lodged. Those who had made the decision were apparently unwilling to tell this court why. Whilst the Lord Ordinary had considered that the petitioners’ Affidavit evidence constituted merely ‘opinion evidence’, there was no contrary evidence – only a ‘miscellany of carefully chosen documents’ to show how the situation was to be ‘handled’. That was not the language of truth, but ‘political spin’ – and, in the exercise of the central power of the Executive to suspend Parliament, spin was not enough. There had to be a legal and valid justification, and no such justification had been provided. Accordingly, this court was entitled to draw the most adverse inference against the decision maker due to his complete failure to come to court and explain his decisions (I v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 727 at para 55; R (Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1409, Laws LJ at para 50; R (Das) v Home Secretary [2014] EWCA Civ 45, [2014] 1 WLR 3538, Beatson LJ at para 80). Where matters were challenged and justifications sought, they must be examined. The Prime Minister had failed to understand Parliament’s fundamental constitutional role, had based his decision on a fundamentally flawed basis, had used his power for wholly improper purpose, had misled himself, and ‘self-deceived’ himself when saying that prorogation was over the party conference season and so would only result in Parliament losing a couple of days. If Parliament did not sit during the conference season, it was because Parliament itself had decided to go into recess. That was a matter for Parliament in the circumstances, and it could decide not to do so, and to reconvene at any time, in order to sit due to any particular constitutional emergency or crisis. In the event of prorogation, that power was taken away from Parliament.

29. Nor were there any pleadings on behalf of the respondent that covered the reasons for prorogation, which merely stated that the claim was academic and hypothetical. That was not true. The pleadings had been finalised on 27 August, the way before the prorogation order was pronounced, although in fact the decision had been taken on 15 August 2019. That was not candidly disclosed in the pleadings, despite unwarranted further adjustment of the pleadings by the respondent outwith the court timetable, on 2 September, to which the petitioners had no opportunity to respond. The petitioners argued that the respondent had ‘misled the court’ by attacking the petitioners’ fear that the decision would be made, whereas the decision had already been made two weeks earlier.

30. The petition had been raised on 31 July, and permission to proceed had been granted on 8 August. As originally lodged, the respondent’s plea was advanced to the effect that there was ‘no basis for reasonable or even hypothetical apprehension’ that the Government intended to advise Her Majesty The Queen to prorogue Parliament with the intention of denying ‘any further Parliamentary consideration’ before Exit Day of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. A procedural hearing had taken place on 13 August and a timetable set down allowing adjustment of parties’ pleadings until 27 August. The petitioners now knew, from the documents lodged by the respondent, that the decision to prorogue had been taken on 15 August, and that the Prime Minister had set up a call to Her Majesty The Queen on 27 August. On that day, the respondent adjusted its plea to remove the words ‘or even hypothetical’. Nonetheless, that plea was misleading. The prorogation order was made on 28 August, and anecdotally ‘started leaking’ on that morning. The final version of the respondent’s plea, as further ‘adjusted’ on 2 September, removed reference to ‘any further’ Parliamentary consideration and substituted ‘sufficient time for any proper’ Parliamentary consideration instead. Accordingly, the position was ‘clearly in view’ at that time.

31. The court was entitled to use common sense, against the background that the Prime Minister had refused to ‘put his real reasons on the line’ by placing an Affidavit before this court under oath. The court could also have regard to the background that the Prime Minister had shown a ‘certain lack of care’ when it came to ensuring that the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, was contained in any announcements. That was the exercise of drawing adverse inferences. The petitioners had been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the Prime Minister on the basis of his record of being ‘less than frank’ and ‘not fully consonant’ with the idea of ‘full truth telling’. The fact that he had chosen to avoid that situation was something to which the court was entitled to have regard. Whilst the petitioners’ primary position before the Lord Ordinary had been that the late lodging of documents by the respondent had been an ‘ambush’ with no explanation or apology, that having been done it was necessary to look ‘carefully, forensically, clinically’ at what had been said and redacted as to what actually lay behind the Prime Minister’s position. In the light of the contents of those documents, it could not seriously be suggested that anybody could have placed a sworn Affidavit before this court to the effect that the decision to prorogue was nothing to do with Brexit, because to do so would be ‘speaking an untruth’. That was the reasonable, proper and necessary inference to be drawn – that prorogation was to do with pushing forward the Government’s plan to push for the UK to leave the EU with or without a deal on 31 October, and if Parliament ‘got in its way’ or no longer presented a ‘united front’ to the EU, then the easiest thing would be to dissolve it. That was what had been done, and why it had been done, and it was an unconstitutional basis upon which to do it. The justification given by the respondent failed any proper scrutiny in a situation where the court was required to apply ‘heightened’ or ‘anxious’ scrutiny to the reasoning offered. The respondent was required to demonstrate ‘the most compelling justification’ for exercise of the power in this way and at this time, which was being used in a manner which had profoundly intrusive and distortive effects on the constitution ‘at this time, of all times’ when it was necessary for Parliament to sit in order to maintain the Government’s political accountability and to allow Parliament to express its views and to legislate for any withdrawal, on whatever terms, of the UK from the EU. The exercise of the power represented an ‘attack’ on the delicate balance of the constitution, even more so against the background of the Government’s policy to pursue Brexit ‘do or die’ on 31 October, which would have a profound effect on the rights of individuals living in the UK and of UK nationals living elsewhere in the EU, and which could mean the sudden, immediate, catastrophic and unlimited withdrawal of all and any rights that could currently be claimed by virtue of status as EU citizens (see, eg, Case C-621/18 Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union EU:C:2018:999, [2019] QB 199 at para 64; Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (No 2) [2018] CSIH 62, 2019 SC 111, Lord Drummond Young at para 53). No such justification had been made available to this court. Rather, the inference could be drawn from the documents lodged by the respondent that the ‘clear and true purpose’ had been to prevent or impede Parliament from holding the Executive politically to account in the run up to Exit Day, and from legislating on the UK’s exit from the EU, and to allow the Executive, notwithstanding that it had no parliamentary mandate to do so, to pursue a policy of ‘no deal’ Brexit without further parliamentary interference. It was a ‘pre-emptive strike’, a ‘smash and grab raid’ on the constitution, a ‘power grab’, intended to silence and disempower Parliament for the crucial period, and was therefore unlawful. In those circumstances, where the Executive had abused its power of prorogation, it was the ‘paramount duty’ of the court to say so (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, Lord Lloyd of Berwick at 571E-F).

32. Parliament was not given to idly passing legislation, and had passed into law, inter alia, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which ought not to be treated as a ‘thing writ on water’ (see, esp, ss. 9, 10 and 13). Those provisions had been enacted in the face of Government opposition and required parliamentary approval of the outcome of negotiations with the EU. It was rather a contrary reading of those provisions by the respondent that they applied only if a withdrawal agreement had been concluded. It was the ‘outcome’ of negotiations, whatever it was, that required parliamentary approval and authorisation in the form of primary legislation expressly and explicitly allowing for the UK to leave the EU whether on terms negotiated or failed to be negotiated. If there was ‘no deal’, then there had to be express parliamentary authorisation, and there was none. This required a complex, lengthy procedure involving Parliament scrutinising the terms of any withdrawal agreement and, if so advised, approving it or not. It had been attempted three times before, and it was clear that Parliament was not to be reduced to ‘rubber stamping’ whatever the Executive placed before it. Parliament intended for itself a ‘full and active’ role in what deal was ultimately reached on the basis upon which the EU and UK would part company. That was entirely to be expected given the impact on fundamental rights and the constitution. There was no time for authorisation or consideration of such matters, where the focus in the course of this week had been for Parliament to take control of business and attempt to legislate in the face of Government opposition and filibustering to make sure that the UK did not leave on a ‘no deal’ basis. It had been announced that prorogation was likely to happen on Monday 9 September, which was part of the apparent attempt to stop the legislation currently going through Parliament from completing the necessary stages and achieving Royal Assent, specifically to thwart the role that Parliament had ascribed to itself in terms of the 2018 Act. The petitioners understood that prorogation was on the schedule of business for Monday. The respondent’s position, that there had been no breach of Parliamentary intention on the basis that prorogation was constituent with the provisions of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019 amounted to ‘gaming the system’ and was untenable in terms of the need to maintain constitutional balance. Simply because Parliament had made provision in relation to the matters contained in the 2019 Act did not mean that Parliament had not thought to discuss or legislate in relation to broader issues arising from the UK leaving the EU. Rather, the overarching provisions in this regard were set out in the 2018 Act.

33. To the extent that the decision to prorogue arose against that background, it was vitiated by error of law that the Government could allow the UK to leave the EU without a deal compatibly with UK constitutional requirements. Absent the requisite parliamentary authority, it could not do so. As a matter of UK constitutional law, (i) EU law was a direct source of individual rights, whether or not mediated through national legislation, and (ii) the Crown had no inherent power to diminish, attenuate or remove individuals’ substantive EU law derived rights by executive action or use of the prerogative in the absence of the specific authorisation by Act of Parliament (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2018] AC 61). The analogy advanced before the court in Miller, of notification under article 50(2) TEU as pulling the trigger with the inevitable result that the bullet would hit the target and end individuals’ rights, had been shown to be false on the basis that the notice could be revoked (Case C-621/18 Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, supra). Therefore, by way of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, Parliament was merely authorising the Executive to initiate negotiations and had not authorised any Executive action that would result in any specific attenuation, diminution, change or removal of the substantive rights of individuals currently enjoyed or derived from EU law. Parliament retained the option of revoking notification if the proposed deal was worse than current conditions. Nothing in the 2018 Act could be read in any contrary sense, to the effect that it authorised the Executive to leave on a no deal’ basis. Section 1 of the 2018 Act merely altered the manner in which EU law derived rights were mediated internally within the UK legal system.

34. Given that there was no Act of Parliament which expressly, or by necessary implication, authorised the Executive to leave on a ‘no deal’ basis, the current exercise of the prerogative to facilitate such an exit was vitiated by error of law. In this regard, it was important to note that ‘necessary implication’ was not to be confused with ‘reasonable implication’ (R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563, Lord Hobhouse at para 45; R (Black) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 81, [2018] AC 215, Baroness Hale at paras 36(3) and (4)). Accordingly, the prorogation order was itself vitiated and fell to be struck down on that basis.

Submissions on behalf of the Lord Advocate (intervening)

35. Counsel (James Mure QC, and Christine O’Neill, solicitor advocate) adopted the written submissions lodged on behalf of the Lord Advocate, noting that permission had been granted to the Lord Advocate to intervene on behalf of the Scottish Government for its interests in the context of withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Those implications flowed from the timing and duration of the proposed prorogation, and concerned the responsibilities of the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament in preparing Scotland and the Scots statute book for withdrawal from the EU. These matters were obviously of very great importance for the Scottish Government, as they were for the UK Government.

36. On the issue of justiciability, it was submitted that the Executive in the UK was democratically accountable because, and only because, of the representative legitimacy of Parliament, within which members of the Executive sat. Once the Executive suspended Parliament, that democratic accountability was lost. The unusual and important element in the present case was that this court was being asked to address the de quo of the Executive’s own legitimacy under our constitution. The Lord Ordinary (at paras 25 and 26) painted a ‘somewhat bleak picture’ where the Executive may, by grace, permit Parliament to sit, but if it chose to prorogue, then Parliament was silenced. That appeared to be the case in respect of prorogation for any length of time, for any reason, and in any circumstances, because such matters were said to be questions of ‘high policy’ and ‘political judgement’. The Lord Advocate submitted that, in principle, the lawfulness of the exercise of discretionary prerogative power was within the jurisdiction of this court (see, eg, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service: re GCHQ [1985] AC 374; R (Sandiford) v Foreign Secretary [2014] UKSC 44, [2014] 1 WLR 2697; see, also, Sir John Laws, Law and democracy 1995 Public Law (Spr) 72 – 93).

37. The respondent’s position was understood to be that, in essence, prorogation was a political matter. However, it was not political in the sense that justiciability was understood to have applied in other cases, such as those concerning the conclusion of treaties or proceedings in Parliament (Shergill v Khaira [2015] AC 359, Lord Neuberger at paras 41 and 42). The present case concerned advice in respect of the making of an Order in Council, which order could be reviewed by this court (Barclay v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014 UKSC 41, [2015] AC 276; R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453). The court’s function, once the matter was before it and accepted as justiciable, could be circumscribed by the nature of the court’s constitutional role or the limits in the court’s institutional capacity. As ever, in law, context was all. In present case, the subject matter that was said to be non-justiciable was the very capacity of Parliament, as the representative organ and sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom, to sit for a period of five weeks. In this regard, counsel agreed with the observation of Lord Drummond Young that this would, effectively, close down parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive. It was not for this court to take a decision about the prorogation of Parliament, and nobody appeared to suggest otherwise before this court. Nonetheless, this court should not readily relinquish its proper constitutional function, which was to probe the quality of the reasoning offered by the Executive for the prorogation, and to ensure that assertions made by the Executive were properly justified.

38. The authorities cited by the respondent to suggest non-justiciability were classically cases about foreign relations or purely political matters (see, eg, McCLean v First Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin)). It would be wrong for the court to find a wholly new subject matter to be outside the realm of justiciability, where the point in issue essentially subverted the existence of the political realm. These were not just acts with a political dimension or matters only of interest to politicians. At stake was an ‘existential issue’ for the institution of Parliament itself, and therefore, the court should be particularly careful not to use broad language like ‘high policy’, ‘political judgement’, or ‘subject matter’, without examining carefully what was at stake. The courts regularly protected Parliament, and the legislation passed by it, from the Executive, including the Executive exercise of prerogative powers (see, eg, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, Lord Browne Wilkinson at 552; Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508). Given that background, it would be curious, indeed, if the courts were to disbar themselves in principle ab initio from protecting the ability of Parliament to sit and debate. The mere fact that political judgement may be involved in the decision as to whether, when, and for how long to advise that Parliament should be prorogued did not mean that the court had no jurisdiction to enquire as to whether the particular Order in Council was justified in the circumstances. The court would be only too well aware that matters of political controversy and consequence passed through the courts on a daily basis. There were many Executive acts with impact in the political sphere, which were nonetheless reviewed by court. The real issue was how the court should review the decision at issue, bearing in mind its constitutional duties and institutional capacity. By that it was meant, what standard of review should the courts apply and with what level of intensity. It was submitted that this court, as a court with a supervisory jurisdiction of the type this court had, was well able to consider the lawfulness of the Order in Council proroguing Parliament by reference to common understandings in this polity as to, firstly, the purpose of prorogation and, secondly, the customary duration of a prorogation prior to a Queen’s Speech – it being understood from papers lodged by the respondent that a period of 1 – 2 weeks was indicated as the ‘standard’ prorogation before a Queen’s Speech – and, thirdly, the necessity that any intrusive interference with a ‘constitutional fundamental’ such as Parliament required a ‘compelling’ justification. In other words, if it were accepted in principle that this was a matter of gravity, which this court should seek to address, the court did have the ‘tools’ or ‘criteria’ by which to judge this Order in Council. The courts were, of course, used to considering whether rational and relevant reasons had been given at the time a decision was made, which justified that act or decision in its factual and constitutional context. That was the sort of exercise involved in judicial review day by day. In the absence of compelling reasons, which were rationally connected to the act or decision, properly understood in its constitutional context, this court could find that that act was irrational and unlawful. The flexibility of the available standards of review allowed this court to take a ‘light’ or ‘intrusive’ approach depending on the value that was at stake, and the context. In the present case, the ‘range of rational decisions’ on a proportionality analysis, given the importance of Parliament sitting, would be prorogation for a period of 1 – 2 weeks on the respondent’s own analysis of simply ‘paving the way’ for a Queen’s Speech (Pham v Secretary of State 2015 1 WLR 1591, Lord Sumption at paras 105 and 106). Those common understandings provide the court with the institutional ability to analyse what had taken place and to review it on ordinary judicial review grounds. In the present case, given the nature of the right involved – namely, the importance of Parliament not simply in a democracy but also to the Executive in drawing its legitimacy from sitting there – the court could analyse the prorogation decision as being outside the range of reasonable decisions. It was ‘the application of proportionality thinking in the context of a Wednesbury challenge’.

39. If the court accepted the reason given at the time of the Order in Council being made, namely that it was simply intended to pave the way for a Queen’s Speech, then the court had to ask whether it was adequate to support a 5-week prorogation. The respondent’s documents had suggested a period of ‘usually under 10 days’. If the court were to be asked to have regard to some other reasons, such as political reasons that might emerge from other documents discussed by the parties, then the court would need to know what those reasons were, and what compelling justification they provided in support of the prorogation.

40. In summary, it was submitted that the mere fact that this Order in Council had an impact in the political sphere did not make the underlying advice or the Order itself non-justiciable. This court should not be blind to the ‘common understanding’ in the UK that, without Parliament being able to sit, legislate and hold the Executive to account, our constitution was ‘bereft’. That common understanding was so strong that the Executive had to show ‘particularly good and rational reasons’ for proroguing Parliament for a period of 5 weeks in the circumstances. The constitutional and sovereign right of Parliament to sit and hold the Executive to account was so fundamental as to require ‘special recognition and protection’ in the courts. The Opinion of the Lord Ordinary would, in effect, remove all such protection, finding ‘curiously’ that Parliament alone could hold the Executive to account for not allowing it to sit. As the Lord Ordinary put it (para 28): “It is for Parliament to decide when it will sit and it routinely does so.” That took matters back to the very ‘curiosity’ and ‘exceptional nature’ of this case – Parliament was disabled from sitting and could not hold the Executive to account.

41. In closing, it was not suggested that the court should do any more than accept its constitutional role, applying the principles and standards of judicial review in the ‘unique circumstances’ of this case, and drawing upon ‘common understandings’ about the purpose of prorogation, its customary duration, and the necessity that any ‘intrusive interference’ with so fundamental a constitutional body as Parliament required, in every case, a compelling justification.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

42. The respondent invited the court to refuse the reclaiming motion, adopting the basis set out in its written note of argument. The respondent’s primary position was that the claim is simply non-justiciable. There were no judicial or manageable standards – in other words, there was nothing in the ‘armoury’ or ‘toolkit’ ordinarily available to the court to assess the kind of decision with which it was confronted in the present case. The instruments available to assess what ordinary decision makers did in carrying out their statutory jurisdiction or decision-making function were simply not present. That was what the expression was intended to mean. The second related aspect was that non-justiciability applied to issues that were intrinsically political or involved ‘high policy’ rather than law. Those were matters in which the courts had, quite rightly, hitherto refused to engage. The description ‘intensely political’ applied equally to the present case and was not special to the cases cited by others.

43. Prorogation was governed by constitutional convention – Ministerial advice to prorogue Parliament was governed by convention, and it was well-established and focussed sharply in Miller that constitutional conventions were non-justiciable. There may, of course, be repercussions if such conventions were not followed, but those repercussions were not going to be in the courts, but in Parliament or before the electorate. That was an important point, which went beyond constitutional conventions. Whilst it had been suggested that there was no accountability, and that that was a ‘gaping hole’ which the courts had to fill, it was important to note that the constitution went beyond accountability by recourse to courts. There was also accountability to be found in the political sphere, in the first instance in Parliament itself or, ultimately, by the electorate going to the ballot box.

44. The Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019 was important, as it spelled out the timetable which Parliament had decided was appropriate by which to receive progress reports on the formation of the Executive. The first report had been due yesterday (Wednesday 4 September) and, indeed, had been laid yesterday. However, its ‘broader significance’ was that Parliament had thereby decided when it wished to sit, and provided what was to happen if it happened to stand prorogued at a time which conflicted with the dates on which it was required to consider those reports. Parliament had thereby recognised the prerogative power to prorogue, and that it could ‘trump’ that power by passing legislation. The interaction between legislative power and the prerogative power of prorogation could be seen there and elsewhere, in instances where the general prerogative power to prorogue was, in particular circumstances, circumscribed by legislative act. It followed that it was Parliament’s job to set out when it was to sit, and it was not for the court to ‘devise’ some form of ‘additional control’, or to provide for additional sitting dates, which Parliament could readily have provided for itself. That was the essence of the respondent’s position in respect of non-justiciability.

45. The respondent’s second principal point was that the petitioners claim was ‘academic’, for precisely the same reasons. Parliament was going to be sitting anyway, at specified periods, in order to comply with s. 3 of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019. The fear that Parliament would simply be ‘closed down’ was not going to materialise, so in that sense the petitioners’ claim was academic.

46. Thirdly, the respondent submitted that the advice to prorogue did not infringe any existing legislative provisions, in particular the Claim of Right 1689 but also various provisions in more recent legislation, as the petitioners claimed.

47. The essence of the prorogation power was uncontentious, and subject only to specific legislative provisions in specific contexts. Parliament had otherwise expressly preserved the prorogation prerogative. Accordingly, the petitioners’ claim in seeking to challenge the advice in the present case did so even though it conformed to all applicable legislative controls. The petitioners invited the court to superimpose its own controls on the ability of the Prime Minister to advise in respect of prorogation. The petitioners had made repeated reference to ‘gaming the system’ in the context of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019 – a more neutral and helpful description was that the exercise ‘recognised the restrictions with which it must comply’. Far from ‘gaming the system’, it was simply how it worked. The Executive had to give way when it was accepted that Parliament should be in session or, if not, recalled at the relevant time.

48. There were no judicial or manageable standards insofar as this was not the kind of thing that the court was equipped to review or control. It was ‘inherently political’, and to weigh a political decision against legal standard was to measure things that were by their nature ‘not commensurable’. The obvious reason for prorogation was for the Government to manage its legislative agenda. That was a political matter for it to deal with year-to-year and month-to-month, and involved questions as to how it could secure its political and legislative objectives, which were obviously political matters. When it would be a good time to interrupt parliamentary business, with the consequence that some bills might fall and not be reintroduced, in many cases forming part of Government’s legislative programme, was also a political matter for it to determine. Similarly, whether and when to set out a new legislative agenda in a Queen’s Speech was a political matter for Government. There may be different views on these matters, as they were intensely or inherently political. It was inherent in seeking to prorogue Parliament and move on to new parliamentary session, that the new Government did so in order to advance its own political policies.

49. The case of Shergill v Khaira [2015] AC 359 was a helpful discussion of non-justiciability generally, at greater length than any of the other authorities, albeit in an entirely different factual context. It was recognised that, amongst the reasons for matters being non-justiciable were that they were either political or could in no way be measured by ‘judicial or manageable standards’, or often it may be both. There was nothing new in these propositions (see, eg, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service: re GCHQ [1985] AC 374, Lord Diplock at 411E). However, the lengthy account could quite usefully be summarised as the ‘absence of judicial or manageable standards’. Whereas, in other cases, the court could be assisted by expert evidence with regard to the standards that ought to be met by professionals, and whether any failure amounted to breach of the relevant standards, it was not possible to bring a politician into court as an ‘expert’ and to ask what should be done as a matter of political judgement. There were no objective standards as views differed and were entitled to respect, but those in the Executive were entitled to have the opportunity during that time to promote their own political views and agenda.

50. It was inherent in the mutual respect of one constitutional institution for the other that accountability had to be sought in the right forum or ‘pillar’ of the constitution, which sometimes meant the legislature rather than the courts (eg R (Wheeler) v Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin). In the present case, too, there was a wide spectrum of opinion on different sides of the issue that arose, namely how the Government should conduct policy in relation to Brexit. The present case was not concerned directly with that issue, but advice to prorogue Parliament. In relation to that, according to the media, there was a wide range of differing views.

51. The advice was not vitiated by any improper purpose, because it was given in a political context taking account of political factors including how the Government wished to develop its political agenda. Having regard to the context, and taking account of the political factors, the advice to prorogue Parliament was exactly what would be expected. That did not render it unlawful, as it was an intrinsic part of advice to prorogue Parliament that it took account of political factors. There was ‘nothing to be ashamed of’ as a politician in promoting a political agenda, nor anything unlawful.

52. The court ought not to enter the political area at the most general level, but also at the narrower level where there was no relevant standard that could be applied. It was not for the court to ‘superimpose’ additional standards (McClean v First Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin)) where accountability could be found in Parliament or the electorate at large.

53. It was accepted, upon questioning by Lord Drummond Young, that for the period of prorogation, Parliament would not be sitting and holding the Government to account. Nonetheless, the appropriate determination of the present application was to conclude that it was not a matter which the court should enter into, having regard to ‘wider considerations’. The court was not faced with a case of an ‘extreme kind’, such as prorogation for an indefinite period, but a specific period of some five weeks. It was relevant to note that, whilst there would be no scrutiny of Executive action by Parliament, that period was limited to five weeks. Indeed, for what it was worth, the terms of the Order in Council also made provision for Parliament to sit in September and October.

54. It was accepted that the courts had jurisdiction to review and control the exercise of prerogative power, and it was accepted entirely that prerogative powers were reviewable in principle, subject to the qualification the courts have not entered into review of certain matters on the grounds of subject matter – one of which was political decision-making. Those were simply not apt for judicial control on the review of prerogative powers in the sense that the court was not equipped to assess them. Such cases were not in the territory of objective standards of decision-making. It was also accepted that the court could apply ordinary principles of judicial review, taking due care to observe that the primary decision-maker was the Executive, but whether it was able to do so depended on the precise exercise of the prerogative power in question. There were some examples where it was clear that the court would not review the exercise of power in relation to foreign policy, but other cases where the court considered that it was properly reviewable on the basis that it was not really a matter of foreign policy albeit that there was a foreign component (see, eg, R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Everett [1989] QB 811). It was necessary to look at the subject matter of the power and the circumstances in which it had been exercised. In cases of political judgement, ‘flexible responses’ were required rather than the application of a ‘strict rule’ (Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32). Prior to the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, dissolution of Parliament was precisely an example of a matter of potentially great importance, which was left to the judgement of political leaders. Although not the same as prorogation, there were similarities at least in their significance – this, too, was a matter of potentially great importance of a political nature. Indeed, if it were suggested that the statutory duty imposed on the Prime Minister to recommend a date to HM The Queen for an ‘early’ general election, then for the same reasons as already discussed, that recommendation would be non-justiciable.

55. On the hypothesis that the real reason for proroguing Parliament was said to be so that there would be no debate on a particular issue, that was a political reason, not a legal reason, in the sense that it was not suitable for scrutiny by the court, and the decision was taken on political grounds, such as a decision to prorogue in order to launch a new legislative agenda. The fact that there was a political motive did not make the advice unlawful. Where advice was given for a political purpose, in a political context, it was a matter of ‘high policy’ rather than ‘low tricks’, whether or not one agreed with the advice or decision taken. If the respondent was correct regarding non-justiciability, there was no place for scrutiny of the adequacy of reasoning – the subject matter was simply ‘off limits’. Whilst judicial review standards could be used to review a decision to prorogue, the present case was ‘very far from being’ appropriate subject matter for such a review as it concerned ‘high policy’ and ‘political judgement’. That being the context, it was not for the court to superimpose additional legal standards.

56. The petitioners’ complaint was originally in respect of prorogation to prevent ‘further’ consideration of withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Subsequently, that was replaced with ‘sufficient time’ for ‘proper’ consideration, which was the claim now. That, of itself, made clear that there weren’t any judicial or manageable standards by which the claim could be determined. The court was being asked to decide what was ‘sufficient’ time and ‘proper’ consideration – that was an invitation not just to regulate the duration and frequency of parliamentary debate, but to ensure that there was enough of it for Parliament’s purpose. The court had no way to determine such matters, and for that reason it was simply not for the courts to decide how much parliamentary time Parliament required to consider matters or how much time would be sufficient. Those were matters for each of the Houses of Parliament itself.

57. It was accepted that prorogation removed the default position that Parliament sat and decided for itself when to do so. However, it was argued that that did not answer the point that, if the complaint was that prorogation was too long, the court had to decide why that was so. If the complaint was that the period denied proper consideration, it could not be for the courts to decide how much parliamentary time was required. Such matters were, in any event, covered by parliamentary privilege. These were areas that the court did not ‘ordinarily or ever’ enter.

58. By contrast, the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019 expressed the will of Parliament, and could be construed in order to understand what Parliament intended. That was the normal, orthodox and proper business of the courts. In the present case, it was suggested that the courts should go beyond what was known to be the express will of Parliament and devise some further controls going beyond, and therefore ‘not entirely consistent’ with the rules that Parliament had devised for itself. It was not possible to see how the court could do so, or how it could be appropriate for the court to do so. The court had no way of knowing whether prorogation was appropriate for 5 days, but not 10. It could not know how much consideration ought to be given to any particular issue, or which issues should be considered when the court, rather than Parliament, thought that Parliament ought to be in session. What period of prorogation was too long or too short? There were historical examples of very short prorogations – even a single day – such as to ensure the passing of the Parliament Act 1949. There was no rule about how long prorogations should be, and to ask what factor might justify a shorter or longer one was to enter into political considerations dependent upon the policies that the Government wished to pursue. Accordingly, the court did not have a standard, nor could it devise a standard or scheme, by which to measure or control the periods when Parliament should sit or be prorogued. The main point taken from the Lord Advocate’s submissions was that prorogation was ‘disproportionate’ in the sense that it was too long for the purposes explained to the public. That argument failed because there was no ‘standard period’ and no requirement that a longer period had to be ‘specially justified’. Section 3(4) of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, first and most generally, expressly recognised the prerogative power to prorogue; and secondly, it expressly limited that power for the purposes set out there. That was precisely how prorogation of Parliament was regulated – by statute, when Parliament wished to preserve itself from prorogation at times or for reasons that it did not wish it to occur. Section 3 of the 2019 Act required Parliament to sit during the period with which the petitioners were concerned, thereby addressing their concern that scrutiny of the Executive would be suspended entirely. It would not be suspended when Parliament was recalled to deal with those matters, if necessary, in accordance with s. 3(4). Secondly, the present application invited the court to go beyond what Parliament had determined for itself and to superimpose additional legal requirements, and that was not an invitation to which the court should accede. Thirdly, the statutory restrictions on prorogation emerged from a political and, ultimately, legislative process rather than legal one. The choices of dates were not ‘intelligibly reviewable’ by the courts, but the results of a political process. This confirmed that it was a matter for Parliament to regulate, and it had done so. Any further controls were inappropriate constitutionally.

59. Parliament had chosen when it wished to sit – when it got there, it was a matter for Parliament to regulate what it did. Once sitting, it could no longer be said that the Executive was not being held to account. Once there, it could be so held. Parliament was hardly going to be held up from scrutinising the Executive once it had been assembled if that was what it wished to do. The respondent entirely accepted the background to the enactment of section 3 of the 2019 Act, but the practical reality was that political accountability need not be restricted. There was no ‘rule’ that it had to be concerned only with formation of the Northern Ireland Executive. In that sense, it was a remedy for the petitioners – not in court, but as a means by which political accountability of the Executive was secured in Parliament.

60. The mutuality of respect between different constitutional sovereignties (Parliament and the courts) required that one should recognise the province of the other, and not interfere or otherwise trench on proceedings of the other (Coulson v HM Advocate 2015 SLT 438). There were various examples from statute where Parliament had chosen to regulate matters. The point was to show that, as with 2019 Act, where Parliament wished to regulate prorogation for particular purposes, it was able to do so and had done so. Moreover, Parliament chose not to regulate prorogation in the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 (see, esp, s. 6(1)). Whilst the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament had gone, the prerogative power to prorogue was undisturbed by that legislation and remained. There were various examples going back to 1707, where Parliament had chosen to regulate for itself what should happen if it stood prorogued upon the occurrence of a particular event, such as the death of the sovereign or various emergency situations where Parliament, if prorogued, ought to be recalled quickly. Therefore, regulation could and had been made by Parliament in situations where it thought appropriate.

61. In certain circumstances, the courts have moved beyond Lord Roskill’s ‘list’ to say that some matters are reviewable, but the question again was whether the nature and subject matter were amenable to the judicial process or whether judges were ill-equipped to deal with it (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service: re GCHQ [1985] AC 374, Lord Roskill at 417; cf R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Bentley [1994] QB 349). Moreover, it was important to note that prorogation of Parliament was ‘quite closely related’ to the dissolution of Parliament, and both were appropriately identified as matters of ‘high policy’. It was conceded that their effects were different, but for present purposes it was sufficient to observe that the subject matter of the prerogative power was clearly ‘high policy’ and politics. The giving of advice to prorogue was on ‘the same general level politically’ as dissolution.

62. The key proposition from Miller was that the courts could not enforce political conventions, and that the appropriate sanction for non-observance was political sanction. That brought the discussion back to the point that accountability was sometimes to be found not in the courts but elsewhere.

63. Finally, it was not clear the extent to which the petitioners suggested that there was any difference between Scots and English law, but there was high authority to the effect that prerogative powers in certain contexts were the same throughout the UK (Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate 1964 SC (HL) 117). There was no difference in the present case. This was a case about advice to the UK sovereign to prorogue the UK Parliament on the advice of the UK Prime Minister. Therefore, it would be ‘most remarkable’ if there were some difference as to the reviewability of the power in those circumstances.

64. In any event, the Scottish courts had recognised that justiciability was a threshold requirement (Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (No 2) [2018] CSIH 62; Gibson v Lord Advocate 1975 SC 136).

65. As the events of the last few days had shown, Parliament was capable of moving at great speed if it wished to do so, and to change the legislative framework applicable to the present claim. A lot of legislative business had been got through this week, which pointed to the fact that the petitioners could not say that their only remedy was in this court. The petitioners had a way of addressing their concerns, and it was assumed that some or all of the petitioners had taken the opportunity to seek the accountability of the Executive in that way through appropriate action in relation to the legislation currently proceeding through Parliament in respect of the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Bill. According to that process, in terms of standing order 24, Parliament took control of its own agenda, which would ordinarily have been determined by the Government. Having done so, it was able to pass a Bill introduced by Hilary Benn MP to ensure that the Prime Minister was not in a position to proceed with a ‘no deal’ Brexit unless certain conditions were satisfied. It was understood, according to media reports, that the Bill would complete its passage today (Friday) and that the Leader of the House had indicated that Royal Assent would follow ‘swiftly’, although it was not known precisely when that would be. If Parliament were sitting, it could insert a legislative requirement that it ought to be in session regardless of the dates indicated in the prorogation order. Clearly the legislation introduced this week was not designed to further Government policy, precisely the opposite. Nonetheless, Parliament was able by the use of standing orders procedure to pass this legislation, which it was understood would shortly receive Royal Assent, with the objective to prevent exit of the UK from the EU without a deal (according to the promoters of the Bill) unless with Parliamentary approval. In the event of contrary legislative provision, the prorogation order would simply fall. Compliance with the order could not be insisted upon, in the face of legislation to the contrary as a matter of parliamentary sovereignty. Nonetheless, it was important to observe that parliamentarians may take different views and, depending on majorities, such legislation may or may not be enacted. These were things that parliamentarians could only achieve if they had appropriate numbers to pass the necessary legislation. That said, Parliament was able to do so ‘at great speed’ if there was sufficient political will to achieve it.

66. The historical background to the Claim of Right 1689 was of great interest, but not as one-sided as the petitioners would have it (notably strong voices expressed contrary views, such as the Faculty’s own Sir George Mackenzie; for contemporary historians, see Colin Kidd, Sovereignty and the Scottish constitution before 1707, 2004 Jur Rev, 3, 225 - 236). Whilst Parliament must be frequently called and allowed to sit, prorogation was in the first instance a matter for the Crown in exercise of the prerogative power and, in the second instance, for Parliament if it chose to limit by legislation – it was not a matter for the courts. In any event, there was no support for the claim that the Claim of Right had been, or was going to be breached. Parliament was regularly adjourned, prorogued or dissolved for one reason or another. It was not required to be in permanent session, so the petitioners needed to have some wider reason for saying that there had been infringement of this provision by prorogation for a particular time or period.

67. With regard to the petitioners’ argument that further legislation was required for the UK to withdraw from EU without an agreement, as a matter of law that was simply incorrect. The legislative groundwork had been laid for the UK to leave without a deal if that was what transpired. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 ended the supremacy of EU law in the UK, converted EU law as at ‘Exit Day’ into domestic law, and preserved laws made here in implementation of EU obligations. In addition, it enabled domestic law to reflect the context of a withdrawal agreement under art. 50 TEU. The short point was that the groundwork had been laid, and there was no need for more.

68. Section 13 of the 2018 Act was concerned only with parliamentary approval of a withdrawal agreement. The petitioners’ concern, about exit from the EU without an agreement, was different. The simple point was that there was no frustration of the terms of that section, as the petitioners would have it, or any other sections upon which the petitioners relied. These provisions were concerned with approval of a deal – if there were no deal, the provisions did not stand in the way of anything.

69. In any event, the petitioners’ argument in this regard was, in fact, irrelevant. The petition was founded upon the proposition that prorogation would defeat the ability of Parliament to prevent the UK’s exit from the EU without a deal. If, however, the petitioners were correct that the Executive had no legislative authority to leave without a deal, then unless Parliament was sitting, it could not provide any such legislative authority. Prorogation clearly did not obstruct the position of Parliament in that regard, and actually made it easier for the petitioners as the UK could not leave the EU until Parliament came back and made the necessary legislative provisions. On the petitioners’ hypothesis, therefore, there was no connection between prorogation and a ‘no deal’ Brexit, since the former would preclude the latter. The respondent did, however, concede upon questioning by Lord Drummond Young that the default position in the absence of further legislation according to UK law, or in the absence of revocation of notification under Article 50 TEU according to EU law, was a ‘no deal’ Brexit in either case. Therefore, Parliament would have to be sitting in order for it to have the ability to avoid the default position. Nonetheless, the point was said to ‘cut across’ the arguments set out in the petition.

70. As to the documents and the timeline of pleadings, adjustments to the respondent’s answers were intimated on 27 August at 16.43. Advice by the Prime Minister to HM The Queen was due to be given in a call on 27 August at 18.00. On 28 August, at 11.11, solicitors acting for the respondent informed the petitioners and the court of a press release advising that the Prime Minister had requested prorogation, or had advised HM The Queen to prorogue. Later that same day, at 15.22, they supplied the petitioners with the terms of the Order in Council which had been made. So far as the pleadings were concerned, whilst the respondent’s answers gave a general account of constitutional law and the three pillars of state, and indicated that the courts did not generally entertain hypothetical or academic matters, it was said in respect of the present petition that it was academic expressly on the basis that Parliament had enacted the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019. That remained the position advanced by the respondent. The relevant plea-in-law had been adjusted by the respondent in order to ‘mirror’ the adjustment of the petitioners’ claim from the denial of ‘further’ time for consideration to the denial of ‘sufficient’ time for ‘proper’ consideration. Thus, it was submitted that the pleadings were not misleading, particularly bearing in mind the very unusual context of the application, which concerned political decision-making at the top of Government in fast-moving and controversial areas. In those circumstances, it was suggested that the Government could not be expected to provide some kind of ‘commentary’ or ‘steady flow’ of information about intentions as to when particular political decisions were going to be advised or taken.

71. The court had evidence if it wished to scrutinise it, albeit that an Affidavit covering the relevant material had not been produced. It was not a universal practice in Scotland to produce Affidavits in judicial review proceedings. Nonetheless, if it would be of assistance, no doubt the respondent could obtain an Affidavit which would explain what the relevant documents were. The Affidavits of the first petitioner expressed her own views, and were entitled to respect, but amounted to untested evidence in areas in dispute and were not accepted as establishing any facts. The timing and value of the latest Affidavit produced only today (Friday) was also questionable and the respondent was inclined to invite the court not to have regard to it for the same reasons. The view of one MP, without intending any disparagement, did not take the court anywhere with respect to whether or not to grant interim relief and, insofar as it related to parliamentary proceedings, was covered by parliamentary privilege and not something with which the court ought to concern itself.

72. The suggestion that Parliament could pass some other Bill during the period before prorogation was anticipated on Monday was ‘completely unrealistic’. It would take at least four days for any Bill to proceed through Parliament. The current Bill was the result of extensive discussions over the summer in order to reach agreement, and the idea that there could suddenly be further amendment was nonsensical. Even if prorogation was done for political advantage, it did not insulate the respondent from challenge where the power was used in a way that was unconstitutional. The petitioners were not seeking any mandatory order as to when Parliament should sit, simply the quashing of the present order. The matter would then go back to the decision-maker, if so advised, to make such decision as would be lawful and constitutional. That simply allowed for the possibility that Parliament could sit, if it so wished. The applicable standard was clearly that of rationality. The respondent’s position seemed to imply acceptance that an ‘excessive’ use of prorogation would be justiciable precisely because it removes political accountability. If that were accepted, then the issue became whether or not the exercise of the power in the present circumstances, at the present period, for the particular dates, was a reasonable exercise for good, proper and sufficient reasons, and not for improper purposes or to an unconstitutional effect, to the satisfaction of the court according to standard judicial review techniques.

Interim remedies

73. The petitioners sought the grant of interim remedies from the conclusion of the summar roll hearing in order to maintain the status quo pending the issue of final judgment in the reclaiming motion. The petitioners submitted that they had demonstrated a sufficient prima facie case and that the balance of convenience favoured the court pronouncing suspension ad interim and, if necessary in order to ensure the respondent’s understanding of the rule of law, interdict ad interim from acting on the prorogation order whilst the case remained at avizandum. It was suggested that such orders would relieve the court of any pressure to come out with a decision in advance of Parliament being prorogued, as anticipated, on Monday 9 September.

74. The normal effect of prorogation was that all pending legislation would fall, and would have to start again in such time remained available thereafter. Hence, the balance of convenience strongly favoured the petitioners against the current background of Parliament’s attempts to take control of its own business as against the Executive seeking to do everything that it could to stop the currently pending legislation from being passed, including threats not to put it forward for Royal Assent. In that event, remedies existed to require Ministers to put it forward for Royal Assent, but there was a danger that all work done thus far would be lost when the pending legislation fell. Whilst the petitioners had been advised that an undertaking had been given by the current Leader of the House of Commons that Parliament would not be suspended until Royal Assent had been given to the currently pending Bill, that had to be viewed in the context of the Government having treated constitutional conventions and truth telling and staying by its word to Parliament ‘with contempt’. The Prime Minister had clearly decided to prorogue Parliament for the dates mentioned as at 15 August, and thereafter ‘flatly denied’ any such plan to Parliament and to the public. Whilst there may be a strong presumption that, if the petitioners were successful, the prorogation order would be null and void ab initio, there was English authority that confused the matter and the petitioners sought to avoid further legal uncertainty. Thus, suspension ad interim would allow parliamentarians to continue to sit and carry out their role.

75. On the second day of the hearing of the reclaiming motion, the petitioners produced a further Affidavit with material collated overnight sworn by the first petitioner, in order to assist in relation to the ‘fast moving situation’ and substantiate the petitioners’ application in respect of interim orders.

76. The respondent submitted that there was no prima facie case and that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of any such orders. The court ought to bear in mind the events that had taken place in Parliament in terms of which Parliament had itself taken steps to avoid a ‘no deal’ Brexit from taking place without a further vote upon it. Secondly, the Divisional Court in London had refused the application in the related case of Miller with reasons to follow. It was for the court to decide how far it wished to place any weight on that matter but it was submitted to be a material factor relevant to the balance of convenience if the court reached that stage. For completeness, however, interim relief was not sought in the Miller application.

77. At the conclusion of the second day of the hearing of the reclaiming motion, the court declined to make any interim orders.

Conclusion of proceedings

78. At the conclusion of proceedings, the court indicated that it had ‘some extremely difficult issues’ to resolve, and would therefore take some time to consider matters.

79. The court hoped to advise its decision on Wednesday 11 September 2019. Whether or not the decision would be in complete written form on that date was uncertain, but it would be made available shortly thereafter in order to enable the UK Supreme Court to consider the matter, on the assumption that leave was granted for that purpose. It was understood that the courts in England were likely to follow that course.

The court made avizandum.

Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland

The following includes a note of Lord Doherty’s judgment given orally on 4 September 2019, refusing the petitioners’ application. This summary was prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance.

1. Lord Doherty delivered a summary of the decision. A fuller decision, including a rehearsal of the submissions of the Lord Advocate and parties, would follow as soon as possible in writing.

Is the issue raised justiciable?

2. In His Lordship’s opinion, the authorities discussed vouched the following propositions. The exercise of some prerogative powers in some circumstances was justiciable, in other cases not. The court’s role in relation to prerogative powers was dependent on the nature and subject matter of the power or its exercise, particularly whether the subject matter was justiciable. Whether its exercise was reviewable depended on the subject matter and context of the power and challenge. Some functions exercised or decisions taken were not justiciable as matters of ‘high policy’ and political judgement, which the court did not have the ‘tools’ or ‘standards’ to assess. Political decision-making could not be measured by legal standards, only by political judgements. The courts would not superimpose legal controls on such matters. Rather, accountability was to Parliament and the electorate.

3. His Lordship was not persuaded that any matters relied upon by the petitioners or the Lord Advocate resulted in the claim being justiciable. In his view, the advice given in relation to the prorogation decision was a matter involving ‘high policy’ and political judgement. This was political territory and decision-making, which could not be measured by legal standards, only by political judgements. Accountability for the advice was to Parliament and, ultimately, the electorate – not the courts.

4. His Lordship did not accept that the prorogation contravened the rule of law, or that it was justiciable because of that. There was no contravention of the rule of law. The power to prorogue was a prerogative power, and the Prime Minister had the vires to advise the Sovereign as to its exercise. The Executive was accountable to Parliament and to the electorate for that advice.

5. Parliament was the master of its own proceedings, rules and privileges, and had exclusive control over its own affairs. The separation of powers entailed that the courts would not interfere. It was for Parliament to decide when it would sit, and routinely it did so. It was not for the courts to devise further restraints which went beyond the limits that Parliament had chosen to provide. Parliament could sit before and after prorogation, and it had recently exercised its legislative power to make provision as to when it should sit, in the form of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019.

6. That was sufficient to dispose of petition. However, His Lordship also provided his views on the other issues raised.

Breach of Claim of Right Act 1689?

7. His Lordship saw some force in the submission that the contention that the Claim of Right 1689 had been breached by the Order in Council of 28 August 2019 was non-justiciable. However, he preferred to decide the issue on the more straightforward ground that there was nothing to support the contention that there had been a breach of the provisions of that legislation. His Lordship accepted the respondent’s submissions on that point.

Does prorogation frustrate the will of Parliament by rendering existing legislative provisions futile? i

8. His Lordship considered that the respondent’s submissions were also correct, that prorogation did not render existing legislative provisions futile.

Other matters discussed

9. Given that the two ‘bulwarks’ of the petitioners argument that prorogation was unlawful were not made out – namely, that it was said to breach the Claim of Right 1689, and to render some existing legislation futile – it was not necessary to say much of other matters. None of the matters founded upon by the petitioners or the Lord Advocate caused His Lordship to conclude that prorogation was unlawful if, contrary to his view, the claim was justiciable.

10. His Lordship was not attracted to the respondent’s submission that the petitioners’ claim was ‘academic’ but he was inclined to agree with the respondent that it was concerned with prorogation and not the requirements of ‘article 50’ and exiting the European Union. The fact that Parliament may not be sitting for five weeks did not, of itself, have any direct effect on individuals’ EU rights. His Lordship was also inclined to agree with the respondents’ analysis of Miller, and the consequences of subsequent legislation

11. Even if, contrary to His Lordship’s view, the matter was justiciable, the context in which the Prime Minister’s reasons fell to be assessed would be that political judgments may be a relevant consideration. His Lordship was not persuaded that the reasons for that advice were unlawful.

12. Accordingly, the petition was refused.


13. The respondent sought the expenses occasioned by the procedure against the petitioners, particularly in respect of the ‘futile’ attempt to seek to reclaim refusal of interim orders, which was ‘simply without merit’, on an ‘agent and client’ basis.

14. The petitioners opposed that motion on the basis that they had come to court in good faith, and had acted in accordance with the court’s interlocutor and timetable, whereas the respondents had ‘acted in bad faith’, would appear to have ‘deliberately flouted’ the court’s interlocutor and ‘refused’ to abide by its timetable. On that basis, it was argued that there was no basis upon which the court should exercise its discretion in relation to expenses to ‘penalise’ the petitioners for the manner in which they brought the case in good faith and in the public interest. The petitioners moved that there should be no expenses due ‘to or by’.

15. His Lordship considered that expenses should follow the usual rule, and was not persuaded that the motion for ‘agent and client’ expenses was justified.

16. Accordingly, the respondent was awarded the expenses of the interim interdict hearing and the subsequent hearing, ‘as capped’.

Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland

The following is a summary of the oral submissions at the hearing of Tuesday, 3 September 2019, prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance.

Preliminary matters.

1. The court permitted the Lord Advocate to intervene by way of written submission.

2. A similar application by a party litigant was refused on the basis that it did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the relevant rule of court (RCS 58.19(4)) and would not be of assistance to the court.

3. Despite the petitioners’ objection, a supplementary note of argument together with additional productions was also received, although late. The court held that, whilst their lateness was ‘regrettable’, the matters raised in the documents were relevant and required to be considered, and it would be ‘highly artificial’ for the court to proceed on a basis different from that anticipated to be presented to the High Court in London at the hearing due to take place on Thursday this week. It would be a matter for parties to make submissions in respect of the weight to be given, and regard to be had, to those documents if they so wished. The petitioners’ objection to late adjustment of the respondent’s pleadings was also repelled, on the basis that the adjustments simply dealt with questions of law and did not cause any prejudice to the petitioners.

Submissions for the petitioners

5. The petitioners (represented by Aidan O’Neill QC and David Welsh, Advocate) submitted that the case was, fundamentally, about accountability – the political accountability of Government to Parliament, and the legal accountability of Government to the Court. In reality, the Prime Minister sought to hold office without accountability, as highlighted by the documents now lodged by the respondent. This was not a situation which the court could permit. The primary notion of the UK constitution was the preservation of the rule of law and the Government was subject to the law, whether it acted by prerogative power or otherwise. The rule of law protected the sovereignty of Parliament, not the assertion of power by the Executive over the Legislature.

6. Notwithstanding the ‘conventional pieties’ of the Queen acceding to the advice of the Privy Council, the reality was the Prime Minister’s assertion (noted in one of the additional productions recently lodged) that the sitting of Parliament was simply a ‘rigmarole’ intended to show that MPs were ‘earning their crust’. Counsel said that the Government’s approach displayed ‘breath-taking contempt’ for the constitution; the Government considered that constitutional conventions concerning the responsible exercise of powers could be broken because they were not legally enforceable. It was on that basis that the petitioners moved the court to pronounced declarator as sought in the petition, which concerned the unlawfulness of a decision of the Prime Minister, as to which the Cabinet was merely advised (a form of ‘autocracy’ albeit supported by special advisers). In those circumstances, the petitioners also sought reduction of the Order in Council of 28 August 2019 proroguing Parliament, interdict against the UK Ministers, including the Prime Minister, from acting on that Order, and the expenses of seeking to vindicate those rights and to protect the constitution.

7. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that any difference between Scots and English law as to the limitations upon executive power to prorogue Parliament was to be resolved in favour of preferring the more limiting constitutional tradition. The constitutional traditions of English law were not to be preferred ‘by default’ – the Scottish court ought to apply Scots law and tradition. There has never been any doubt that the Executive, even during times of unconstitutional monarchy, was subject to the law and could be called before the courts. The three pillars of state were of equal rank and dignity, and respect was owed by each. In particular, respect was owed by the Executive to this Court, albeit that the manner in which the litigation had been conducted by the respondent to date was said to show a certain lack of respect for the court and its jurisdiction. There was said to be a lack of ‘constitutionally required respect’ shown by the Executive for the legislature. It was not simply ‘politics as usual’ but an attempt to upset the traditional and necessary balance of power between the Executive and legislature in favour of some kind of ‘divine right’. If the power to prorogue Parliament was being used to avoid the political accountability built into our democratic constitution, and if Parliament was to be shut down and silenced, the principle of accountability still arose to be taken up by this Court. The court’s role in the preservation of the rule of law was to ensure accountability insofar as it was for the Executive to give an account of what it claimed to be doing. In the absence of sworn evidence, however, the court was entitled to draw adverse inferences about the reality of Executive action in the present case. There was no deference or presumption that what was being said on the part of the Executive was true. In the present case, the Executive’s action amounted to an attempt to dominate without due and proper regard to Parliament. The use of power in such a way amounted to an attack on, and diminished parliamentary sovereignty (see Prof Paul Craig, ‘Prorogation: Constitutional Principle and Law, Fact and Causation’, Oxford Human Rights Hub, 31 August 2019). The sovereignty of Parliament was a fundamental constitutional principle, and insofar as Parliament was not able to protect that principle, the court must exercise its constitutional duty to do so.

8. The power of prorogation had to be exercised for proper powers, it was necessary to be ‘always vigilant’ against abuse of that power, and it was the province of the court to determine its proper province. There was no inherent legislative power [outside Parliament], only those powers delegated by Parliament or permitted by Parliament to be retained. Accordingly, any purported exercise of powers, which contravened the fundamental purposes for which those powers were left or specifically granted, would be unlawful. This ran directly contrary to the respondent’s position that the exercise of prerogative power was not justiciable or subject to limitation by the courts – that it could be used in any way, and to political advantage if the Executive so wished, and the court could not do anything about it. This was not the case in a state governed by law, rather than ‘whim’ or ‘arbitrary power’. The prerogative was a source of power only available where the case was not regulated by statute, inherent and residual in nature, and it could never be used to defeat or frustrate domestic rights created by Parliament (Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd v Lord Advocate 1964 SC (HL) 117, Lord Reid at 122, R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, 2018 AC 61). The issue of leaving the EU without any deal would mark a fundamental change in domestic rights created under the European Communities Act 1972, including EU law and derived rights. Those rights would change in a ‘particularly radical way’ should the UK leave the EU without the conclusion of any withdrawal agreement: the ‘no deal Brexit’. The Miller principle made it clear that the exercise of prerogative power could not lawfully be used in such a manner as to defeat, frustrate, limit or remove the rights of individuals, without express Parliamentary authority by way of primary legislation. That is what EU exit would do, and there was no authority for it.

9. The prorogation of Parliament in the circumstances of the present case was precisely an example of the Government abusively seeking to entrench its power contrary to constitutional norms. In those circumstances, the court could declare it to be unlawful (Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, 2015 SC (UKSC) 1, Lord Hodge at para 35). It was also a clear expression of the ‘overlapping’ political and legal accountability of the Executive to Parliament and the courts respectively (R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014] UKSC 41, 2015 AC 276, Baroness Hale at para 57). The Government must obey the law as a matter of obligation, and the fact that advice was given and was unlawful was sufficient to render the resulting act of HM Queen unlawful and reducible by the court. Thus, UK Ministers, including the Prime Minister, could be called before the court, interdicted and, if necessary, found in contempt of court. The constitution was a legally limited monarchy, and abuse of the power of prorogation had happened before [in the 17th century], such that those in power were found to have forfeited office by breaching the limits of that power, and attempting to transform a limited power into an ‘arbitrary despotic power’. Parliament does not legislate in vain, and the plain words of the Claim of Right 1689 could not be ignored. The prerogative power could not be exercised contrary to the laws and liberties of the kingdom. Any claim that executive power is unlimited or unfettered was ‘untenable’. It was peculiarly the province of the court to specify those limits, and it was ‘settled law’ that the exercise of power was subject to review according to the ordinary principles of legality, rationality and procedural impropriety (Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508, R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, 2009 1 AC 453).

10. The Executive was subject to an obligation owed to the court to cooperate and make candid disclosure ‘by way of affidavit’ of the relevant facts and reasoning behind the decision challenged (Belize Alliance of Conservation v Department of Environment [2004] UKPC 6, 2004 Env LR 38, Lord Walker at 86). There was no sworn evidence in the present case as to the reasoning underlying the exercise of prorogation, at this time, and in this manner, and the petitioners had been subjected to ‘ambush’ by late documentation in the present case. In those circumstances, the court was entitled to draw adverse inferences against the decision maker who was not entitled to the benefit of any doubt. It was necessary to consider the record and determine the credibility and reliability of what was said against a background of an individual [the Prime Minister] whose personal, professional and political life was said to be characterised by ‘incontinent mendacity’ or an unwillingness or inability to acknowledge or speak the truth. The Prime Minister had chosen not to be accountable to this court and sought not to be accountable to Parliament. It was proper for this court critically to examine and sceptically to question the reasoning and justification given. The court ought not to take the documents produced by the respondent at face value, and was required to exercise ‘anxious scrutiny’ as to whether the ultimate intention was to achieve a ‘no deal Brexit’ to the deprivation, diminution and abolition of individual rights, which it was not entitled to do. These matters were governed by the principle of legality. The basic principles of the constitution could not be overridden by ambiguous words (Axa v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2012 SC (UKSC) 122). The reality was that causation was lacking, and the prorogation of Parliament would hamper the Prime Minister in efforts to ‘kick start’ the new legislative agenda (Craig, supra). The true purpose was to avoid accountability to Parliament in the improper exercise of power ‘entrusted’ to the Prime Minister and the Executive. If there was an abuse of power, there was a breach of trust, and those were purely legal concepts. The purported use of the power amounted to a deliberate and conscious abuse as a ‘pre-emptive strike’ intended to ‘silence and disempower’ Parliament in the crucial period in the run up to ‘Exit Day’, which was unlawful (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513).

11. If Parliament passed the necessary statute, only then would the Executive have authority to effect the withdrawal of the UK from the EU in accordance with whatever terms so stipulated by Parliament. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, in the face of Government opposition, gave the role to Parliament effectively to scrutinise and make the final decision as to those terms. Parliament did not intend to write a ‘blank cheque’ allowing the UK to ‘crash out’ of the EU. Rather, Parliament intended that it be involved and give approval in statutory form in respect of the outcome of negotiations, and did not authorise the Government simply to give up or allow the passage of time to result in the UK leaving without a deal (R (Miller), supra). That was the obligation upon Parliament in the absence of any power on the part of the Crown itself in failing properly to conduct international negotiations, and nothing had been produced to counter the petitioners’ position that prorogation would leave insufficient time for Parliament to carry out its constitutional function. Notwithstanding that the specific dates did not contravene the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, this did not allow the Government to ‘game the system’ and to use prorogation for another unlawful purpose.

12. Ultimately, the exercise of power was vitiated by error of law to the extent that the Prime Minister appeared to be of the view that he could push forward, if necessary, with a ‘no deal’ Brexit. There was no such power under law, no authority of Parliament authorising such a course by statute, and such a law was required. The UK Supreme Court had determined correctly (R (Miller), supra) that EU law could be regarded as a direct source of individuals’ rights, the Crown had no power to diminish those rights as a matter of UK constitutional law, and, if those rights were to be removed, altered or diminished by Crown action or inaction, then that could be done only with the express authority of Parliament by enactment to the effect that ‘you can go for no deal’. It was now recognised that the ‘article 50 notification’ was not irrevocable, and the analogy of pulling the trigger and the bullet inevitably reaching the target [discussed in R (Miller)] was incorrect (Case C-621/18 Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union EU:C:2018:999, [2019] QB 199). On that basis, Parliament enacted the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, but that authorised the Prime Minister merely to begin the process of withdrawal, and not to end it. There remained the sovereign right to withdraw the notification if it turned out that the negotiated deal, or no deal, turned out to be worse than remaining in the EU, which only Parliament could determine and legislate for in express terms. No such authorisation to end the process of withdrawal existed, nor was it a necessary implication from the 2018 Act (R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioners of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563).

13. If Parliament was prorogued, not only was it prevented from holding the Government to account politically, but it was unable to pass the necessary legislation to authorise even a ‘no deal’ Brexit, in which case the court was the only constitutional actor left standing and required to set down the limits of the power of the Executive in the circumstances. Those limits were known to the court from the cases of Miller and Wightman. Accordingly, the petitioners sought interdict against any attempt to ‘push a no deal’ in the absence of express statutory authorisation by Parliament. Whilst it would be preferable for Parliament to make that decision, the courts were forced to do so on the basis that the Executive had ‘shut down’ Parliament. Thereafter, it would be for Parliament to decide whether to mandate the Government to seek extension of ‘Exit Day’, to ‘revoke article 50’ altogether or expressly to allow a ‘no deal’ Brexit. For that to be done, however, Parliament needed to sit. Accordingly, in the circumstances of the present case, the use of the power of prorogation was unlawful.

14. It was accepted that the courts were not generally equipped to determine matters of public policy, but it was argued that the present case was not about public policy, nor did it raise political questions. Fundamentally, it concerned the balance of power amongst the three arms of state and an illicit attempt by the Government to upset that balance and to bring itself above the legislature. The court, as guardian of the constitution and rule of law, was required to guard against that kind of unconstitutional appropriation of power. The cases relied on by the respondent all presupposed the availability of alternative constitutional measures to ensure political accountability, whereas the use of prorogation in the present case was precisely intended to take away that accountability, and to ‘stop politics from working’. The court was required simply to ensure that the constitution worked as it should do, and to determine how far power extended to the Executive and how far it resided in the legislature. Whilst the Government argued that there were no standards by which the Government may be held to account, the fundamental standard was that it should not undermine parliamentary sovereignty by withdrawing altogether the possibility of Parliamentary action. It was not a question of the courts interfering with the dates when Parliament has chosen to sit, but that the Executive was not entitled to use its powers to prevent it from sitting in the circumstances of the present case. The use of the power went directly against parliamentary intention (and obligation) to sit and consider matters in the run up to ‘Exit Day’. The petitioners did not rely on constitutional conventions; the proposed ‘power grab’ by the Executive for its own purposes was simply not permitted by constitutional law.  

Submissions for the respondent

16. The respondent (represented by David Johnston QC, and Andrew Webster QC) invited the court to refuse the petitioners’ application. It was submitted that the case raised large constitutional questions, which were highly unusual to come before the court. Ultimately, however, the issue taken by the respondent was that it simply was not something that should be before the court at all – it was non-justiciable.

17. In summary, it was submitted that the claim was non-justiciable insofar as there simply were no judicial tools or standards by which the court could decide whether the ministerial advice at issue was lawful. It was politics or ‘high policy’, not law, and for that reason, the courts were not the right place for these matters to be resolved. Rather, they could be discussed and perhaps resolved in Parliament. More specifically, Parliament had made its own clear provisions as to when it wished to sit, which expressly provided for Parliament to be prorogued at some points and recalled if necessary (Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, s. 3). It would be impossible for the Government lawfully to prevent that from taking place.

18. The respondent took ‘strong issue’ with the suggestion that the Government had acted unconstitutionally. First, the court did not have the necessary tools to assess the legality of political decisions, and Parliament had occupied this area for itself anyway. Secondly, the petitioners’ claim was academic, in the sense that provision had already been made to enable Parliament to sit for certain periods to the end of October. In that sense, the ‘constitutional fear’ which the petitioners raised had been addressed by Parliament itself deciding when it wished to sit. Thirdly, the Claim of Right 1689 did not set out mandatory periods during which Parliament was required to sit, nor when or for how long. Nor did it provide a legal standard by which to measure whether or not a decision to advise HM Queen to prorogue Parliament was lawful. Neither the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, nor the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2018 altered that position, and none interfered with or frustrated in any way the constitutional position. Therefore, the petitioners’ claims in that regard ought not to succeed.

19. The key to the issue of non-justiciability was that there was no statute or source of law that regulated prorogation or the advice given to HM Queen in relation thereto. In specific circumstances, Parliament has said ‘no prorogation at this time’ but beyond that prorogation remained a prerogative power. There was no dispute that statute replaced the prerogative that extent, but it had not done so in the present case and the relevant power remained intact.

20. There were no standards of the kind which courts use to control or scrutinise the legality of Executive action. This case concerned an inherently political decision and the courts were not equipped to measure political judgments against legal standards (Shergill v Khaira [2015] AC 359). This was political territory and decision making, which could not be measured by legal standards but only by political judgments which had to permit of a degree of flexibility according to circumstances (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service: re GCHQ [1985] AC 374; R (Wheeler) v Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin)). There was a wide spectrum of opinion, all of which was entitled to expect, but the right forum for resolution of views was not in court (McCLean v First Secretary of State [2017] EWHC 3174 (Admin)). It was not appropriate to impose legal standards on matters of politics.

21. It was necessary to take a more nuanced approach to the rule of law than the petitioners had adopted, in order to understand the proper role of the court. The very fact that the court was faced with trying to weigh political judgments, and the reasons why they were reached, suggested that it was outwith the territory where legal standards could be deployed (Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [2002] NI 390). The courts were not used to providing responses as to whether something, such as the dissolution of Parliament, was or was not on the right side of a line. These were cases of high policy and political judgment, with which judges at the highest level had recognised the courts were not equipped to deal. They could not be measured against the court’s normal standards, such as against a standard of rationality, and the law did not superimpose additional legal standards upon political considerations. The highest courts had repeatedly confirmed the lack of standards against which exercise of the prerogative could be assessed (R (Sandiford) v Foreign Secretary [2014] UKSC 44, [2014] 1 WLR 2697). There was a restriction on whether the court will exercise its jurisdiction, and there remained important differences between statutory and prerogative powers. The dissolution of Parliament was a notable example of something within the ‘forbidden area’, and prorogation ‘related to that’. There was also an important distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability. The respondent did not argue that the court did not have jurisdiction: the respondent’s argument was that it should not be exercised in the present case. In other words, this was a non-justiciable matter (R (Barclay), supra). It was ‘telling’ that the petitioners had ‘reshaped’ their case to protest about the denial of sufficient time for proper consideration of withdrawal from the EU, and it could hardly be clearer that there were no judicial standards to consider how much time or parliamentary consideration would be enough. In the absence of statutory regulation, this was purely a matter for Parliament acting as a body.

22. The petitioners’ concern that Parliament must be able to sit has been addressed by specific limits laid down by Parliament itself. Thus, when Parliament wishes to control the prerogative in any particular context, it does so expressly and has done so in relation to prorogation. That was the way, constitutionally, to exercise control of the prerogative – not by appealing to the courts. In essence, the present application invited the court to go beyond what Parliament thought appropriate and to superimpose additional legal requirements. That was not just interference with the political process but also the legislative one. It was not for the courts to devise additional controls, which would require Parliament to sit more often or for longer periods.

23. The respondent argued that the Government’s position was supported by consideration of wider constitutional matters. First, the respondent’s submissions on the petitioners’ particular claim ‘fitted’ with the wider notion of separation of powers, and parliamentary privilege (Coulson v HM Advocate 2015 SLT 438). This was a crucial constitutional principle, which the petitioners’ application clearly violated. The dissolution and prorogation of Parliament were matters that fell within its jurisdiction, not the court’s, because they were inherently political. This was reflected in the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, which expressly preserved the Executive’s power to prorogue. Secondly, there was no dispute that the prerogative power was reviewable by the court but this depended on the subject matter and context in which it was exercised (Re GCHQ, supra). In essence, these points mirror those made about non-justiciability. The proper place for these matters to be scrutinised, of which the dissolution of Parliament was a striking example, was in the political forum, and those who made decisions that did not go down well there would be held to account by Parliament or by the electorate. Thirdly, courts of law did not enforce political conventions, the sanction for non-observance being political and not legal (R (Miller), supra). Such matters should not engage the attention of the courts. This underlined the fact that accountability was an important aspect on which the constitution relied, but accountability to the courts was not the only form of accountability. The courts had been clear in recognising that in some cases accountability had to be found or sought elsewhere, namely in the political process. Fourthly, it was not disputed that it was necessary to be clear about being in a Scottish court in Scotland but no difference as to the result of approach was identified as between Scots or English law. There appeared to be no difference in relation to the prerogative power at issue, and it would be odd if there were any such difference leading to different results in different parts of the UK. It was highly unlikely that a differential approach to the exercise of the prerogative in Scotland or England would make any kind of sense, rather it would be likely to lead to absurdity (Burmah Oil Co (Burma Trading) Ltd, supra). In any event, the need for a justiciable issue was a threshold requirement, and this had not been met where it was essentially a political matter at issue (Gibson v Lord Advocate 1975 SC 136).

24. The petitioners’ claim was academic to the extent of the legislative provisions already made (Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019) and the terms of the Order in Council under challenge, which set out the dates when Parliament will sit before and after the period of prorogation. The court was not faced with an Executive that was ‘out of control’ and ‘seeking to close down Parliament’ or ‘remove the franchise’ (cf Moohan, supra). Rather, it was faced with five weeks of prorogation, against a background where statute and the relevant Order in Council had already regulated the sitting days available to parliamentarians.

25. As to the specific grounds of challenge advanced by the petitioners, it was accepted that the Claim of Right 1689 was a fundamental constitutional document, but its relevance was unclear. The key words were that Parliament was to be ‘frequently called’ and ‘allowed to sit’, and freedom of speech and debate secured to members, which the petitioners claim would be breached if the Order in Council were to stand. However, it was up to Parliament to decide what specifics attached to the word ‘frequently’, as to which there had never been any general legislative provision or other basis for the court to impose any such requirements. Even if there were some legal standard, there was nothing to support the proposition of any breach, standing that Parliament does not sit in permanent session, and so adjournment and prorogation were necessarily envisaged. Moreover, the prorogation at issue did not cut across the provisions of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, as already mentioned. The petitioners had to maintain that, notwithstanding the legislative requirements, there would be a breach of the Claim of Right unless there were additional sittings to those specified in the 2019 Act. There was nothing in the concept of parliamentary sovereignty that required the courts to decide, or could justify them in deciding, that legislative schemes set up by Parliament needed to be supplemented, such as by means of additional sitting days.

26. The provisions of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 had no application to an exit without a deal. In that event, there would be no withdrawal agreement to be ratified or approved, nor any reason to amend the definition of ‘Exit Day’ (2018 Act, ss 13 and 20). There was no clear argument as to how these provisions were frustrated and the respondent invited the court to reject that claim. Furthermore, insofar as the petitioners relied upon the terms of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011, any challenge to a recommendation to HM Queen to fix a date for an early general election thereunder would also be non-justiciable for all the reasons already mentioned (2011 Act, s 2(7)).

27. As to remedies, there was no basis for reduction advanced that withstood scrutiny. No legislation beyond the Claim of Right 1689 was relied upon as inconsistent with the advice and Order in Council at issue. With regard to interdict, there was no wrong identified that the courts should seek to interdict.

28. The present application was not concerned with legal requirements for exiting the EU, but prorogation of Parliament and the dates upon which Parliament may stand prorogued or, as the petitioners would have it, not. That did not, of itself, have any direct effect on individuals’ EU law rights. Moreover, the respondent did not agree that it was unlawful to leave the EU with ‘no deal’ unless further legislation was enacted by Parliament. Parliament has proceeded on the basis that, with or without a deal, exit will take place and the necessary measures are being, or have been, put in place to allow for that (European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018). In any event, that argument was wholly inconsistent with the basis of the petition.

29. Finally, the reasons for the advice which is the subject of challenge have been set out in the documents disclosed in accordance with the ‘duty of candour’. However, the respondent’s position is that the court should simply not enquire into the reasons for the advice or scrutinise their adequacy. In short, that advice was non-justiciable. If the court wished to do so, however, the respondent submitted that the reasons were lawful, relevant and legitimate. Parliament would be able to sit and consider such matters as it may wish in the period up to October. Parliament had already made provision in relation to a variety of matters which formed the subject of this claim. There was nothing unlawful in the Prime Minister advising HM Queen to prorogue Parliament in order to enable the new government to set out its legislative agenda, to end the very long previous parliamentary session leaving time to complete the few remaining matters, and the specific political considerations of the kind referred to in the relevant documents, having regard to the availability of parliamentary time and the anticipated EU Council on 17 and 18 October. It was not accepted that there was no proper evidence before the court. Moreover, the evidence of the petitioners [the affidavit of the first petitioner, Joanna Cherry QC MP] was untested and essentially amounted to matters of opinion, quite reasonably ‘strongly influenced’ by particular political views. In essence, when the Prime Minister gave advice on prorogation, that necessarily involved political matters and it was a political decision made in a fast moving and highly controversial situation. This was not a situation where the law could properly superimpose additional legal standards on this political process. If the respondent’s position was accepted in that regard, the position of the Lord Advocate did not properly alter the legal analysis.

30. It could not realistically be said that it would be unlawful for Parliament to be prorogued for any period between today and 31 October. It could not be the role of the court to specify the sittings that Parliament should hold, far less those sufficient for proper consideration of Brexit, which was not a matter the court had any means of assessing or enforcing by any legal standard. These were political issues and questions, and their resolution had to be found in the political arena. Accordingly, the petitioners’ application should be refused.

The court adjourned to attempt to reach a decision overnight, and will reconvene at 10am tomorrow.



The following includes a note of Lord Doherty’s judgment given orally refusing the petitioners’ motion for interim orders. This summary was prepared by a reporter of

Session Cases.

Note of Lord Doherty’s judgment

The remedies sought by the petitioner are set out in statement 18 of the petition. These are (1) declarator that it is ultra vires et separatim unconstitutional for a minister of the crown, including the Prime Minister, with the intention of denying sufficient time for parliamentary consideration of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, to purport to advise Her Majesty The Queen to prorogue the Union Parliament; (2) interdict against any minister of the crown advising Her Majesty, with the intention of limiting the time available to Parliament to properly consider the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, to prorogue Parliament; and (3) such other orders as the court may think just and reasonable in all the circumstances.

The petition was lodged on 30 July 2019. Permission to proceed was granted on 13 August and an accelerated timetable was fixed. An early substantive hearing has been fixed for 6 September 2019.

Since the last adjustment of the petition and answers, the petition has been overtaken by events. On 28 August 2019 Her Majesty made an Order in Council that parliament shall be prorogued no earlier than 9 September 2019 and no later than 12 September 2019, until 14 October 2019. It is common ground that Her Majesty accepted the advice of the Prime Minister.

That same day, a motion was enrolled by the petitioners for interim interdict against any Minister of the Crown taking any steps to implement the Order in Council and interim suspension. The motion was heard yesterday. The petitioner sought interim suspension of the Order in Council and interim interdict against taking any steps to implement the Order in Council, as well as interim interdict against any minister of the crown advising Her Majesty to prorogue parliament before 31 October 2019.

The petitioners argued that the advice of the Prime Minister was unlawful on the basis that:

  1. 1. It was motivated by the desire to restrict the time available to Parliament to hold the government to account.
  2. 2. It frustrated the will of Parliament as expressed in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act 2019 and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011.

The petitioners argued that there was a prima facie case for interdict and suspension, and that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of interim orders.

The Court refused the motion for interim orders for the following reasons:

(1) the Court had a broad discretion when considering motions for interim orders, and required to determine whether there was a cogent need for interim orders to be made; (2) having regard to the fact that a substantive hearing was due to take place on 6 September 2019, a date before parliament will be prorogued, there was no cogent need for interim orders at this time; (3) in any event the balance of convenience did not favour the granting of interim orders; (4) it was not appropriate for the court to express any view on whether the petitioners had a prima facie case, where a substantive hearing is due to be heard shortly and at which full argument would be made; (5) if the petitioners were right that the advice of the Prime Minister was unlawful, appropriate remedies could be granted by the court after the substantive hearing; and (6) it was in the interests of justice, and the public interest, that the substantive hearing be accelerated.

Other matters

The Court appointed the substantive hearing to be accelerated to 3 September 2019. The respondent’s motion for the expenses of the motion hearing was refused and expenses held to be in the cause. Notes of Argument were ordered to be lodged by 12 noon on 2 September 2019.

Counsel on behalf of the petitioners stated in court that they invited the respondent to lodge an affidavit from the Prime Minister in order that he may give evidence as to why he advised Her Majesty to prorogue parliament, and stated that they reserved their position on whether cross examination of the Prime Minister would be sought on that issue.

Posted 30 August 2019

Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland

The following is a summary of the oral submissions at the hearing of Thursday, 29 August 2019, prepared by a Reporter for Session Cases who was in attendance.

A motion for interim orders was heard by Lord Doherty, a judge of the Court of Session in Edinburgh, in the petition brought by Joanna Cherry QC MP and others for judicial review of the UK Ministers’ advice to HM Queen to prorogue the UK Parliament. Permission was granted earlier this month for the case to proceed, and a full hearing is anticipated to take place next week. Today’s hearing was sought on an urgent basis yesterday, and convened for the purpose of considering whether interim orders should be granted, in effect, to suspend the effect of yesterday’s order setting out the intended prorogation of Parliament (from a date between 9 and 14 September, until 14 October 2019), and to interdict the UK Ministers from acting meantime on the basis of that order.

The petitioners (represented by Aidan O’Neill QC; David Welsh, Advocate) invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the court, and argued that the advice given was unlawful, and that it was the court’s duty to provide an effective remedy in order to ensure that the rule of law was maintained. Ultimately, the intended purpose was to ensure that the UK Government remained politically accountable to Parliament for its actions. The court was entitled to review the lawfulness of the advice given, as a result of which it was argued that the resulting decision of HM Queen could also fall as ‘unlawful, unwarranted and unconstitutional’. Whether or not it was ‘competent’ for UK Ministers to advise HM Queen to prorogue Parliament in the present circumstances, a matter of weeks before the UK was due to exit the European Union, was said to be a question of law and constitutional interpretation, and therefore properly a matter for the court, albeit that the resolution of legal questions will often have political consequences. Nonetheless, the lawfulness of advice to the Sovereign by Ministers or Privy Counsellors, which resulted in the passing of legal measures by the Sovereign, was ‘justiciable’. If the court was satisfied that the advice to prorogue Parliament amounted to an abuse of power, then there was an obligation on the Sovereign to recall the resulting order of prorogation. The fact that the advice had been acted upon did not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of the advice that underpinned the decision in question and to grant interdict where appropriate (see R (Barclay) v Lord Chancellor (No 2) [2014] UKSC 41, [2015] AC 276; Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458; Edwards v Cruickshank (1840) 3 D 282, Davidson v Scottish Ministers 2006 SC (HL) 41). According to the Claim of Right 1689, there were legal limits upon the monarchy: the constitution could not be altered into “ane arbitrary despotick power…by the advyce of Evill and wicked Counsellors’. Parliament ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit. Once called, the power of prorogation should not be used ‘abusively’ in the sense of preventing Parliament from carrying out its constitutional duties, including giving voice to freedom of speech and debate amongst its members. The power was not absolute or unfettered, it had to be used in accordance with public trust. There was no precedent for its use to create an irreversible situation, namely that the UK would leave the EU ‘deal or no deal, do or die’, with Parliament prevented from doing anything about it. The common law was informed by principles of democracy and the courts could step in to declare such conduct unlawful, even in cases concerning the exercise of prerogative power (Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, 2015 SC (UKSC) 1; R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453; R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262). The reasons that were said to justify the prorogation of Parliament ought to be subject to ‘an anxious and profound degree of scrutiny’ in situations affecting fundamental rights or otherwise having profoundly intrusive effects. In the present case, the power was being relied upon avowedly for the purpose of ensuring that the UK leaves the EU ‘deal or no deal’ by 31 October 2019, and that ‘parliamentary procedures don’t get in the way of that’. Leaving the EU would have profound effects on the rights of individuals, and the reasons stood up to ‘very little proper scrutiny’ and were ‘counter intuitive’. In any event, it was a fundamental misdirection in law to assume that the Government had any authority to allow the UK to leave the EU without a deal, in the absence of primary legislation authorising that course (R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] AC 61; Case C-621/18 Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union EU:C:2018:999, [2019] QB 199). In the event of prorogation, there would be insufficient time for the necessary legislative work to be done, and the political accountability of Parliament would be avoided. That was the intention, it was unconstitutional, and the court should stop it. An effective remedy required the court to positively order the Government, if it insisted on proroguing Parliament, either to extend the ‘article 50’ time limit or formally to revoke the notification as a matter of ‘extreme necessity’. Accordingly, it was argued that the petitioners had set out the necessary prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of granting the interim orders sought.

The Advocate General for Scotland (represented by Roddy Dunlop QC), submitted that the motions should be refused. The petitioners raised matters of the highest constitutional importance, involving real questions of separation of powers, which were manifestly unsuited for determination on an interim basis. In any event, the contested matter of prorogation had already taken place, and was ‘classically’ a matter that was not justiciable. It was an act of the Sovereign herself, exercising a privilege that remained hers alone, separate from the giving of advice in respect of which the court had granted permission to proceed, with which the court simply would not interfere (Prorogation Act 1867, s 1). It was recognised that certain matters were outwith the scope of judicial review either because they were ‘intensely political’ or the privilege of Her Majesty; there remained a residue of cases where the court would not tread (Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374; De Smith’s Judicial Review, paras 3-034 – 3-042). Following the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, the power to dissolve Parliament was no longer the exclusive preserve of the monarch, but the position remained unchanged in respect of prorogation. The respondent argued that either the power was reserved to the monarch, with which the courts would not interfere, or it involved such questions of policy that the court should not intrude because it was ill-equipped to do so. There was nothing to justify interference with the intensely political decision making under scrutiny in the present case. The petitioners were seeking to attack something that was not justiciable, and none of the authorities referred to by the petitioners suggested otherwise. There was a clear convention that the Sovereign would follow the advice of her Government in proroguing Parliament, and parliamentary convention was, again, something long recognised as not justiciable, as had been recognised in R (Miller). If, according to the petitioners, it had been done for ‘bad political reasons’ or ‘improper political motives’, then such matters of politics were, again, not justiciable. In any event, the advice tendered to HM The Queen, and the motivation behind it, were both plainly covered by parliamentary privilege and could not be the subject of enquiry anywhere other than in Parliament. If Parliament had a problem with it, it was for Parliament to sort it out. That was so, particularly where Parliament had itself passed primary legislation, which expressly recognised the fact that Parliament may be prorogued and nonetheless provided for the sitting of Parliament (Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019).

The prorogation of Parliament, without any ‘say’ by Parliament as to whether it was prorogued or not, was a regular occurrence, and never in our history of law had it been the subject of judicial interference, even where it might have had a political motive (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, no 8589, 11 June 2019, p 8). The matter did not become justiciable simply because the length of prorogation was greater than the petitioners would have liked, or because it was asserted to be borne of political motives which the petitioners sought to impugn. Moreover, the prorogation order was in precisely the same terms as on any other occasion – it was ‘standard wording’. The reasons expressed by the Prime Minister were all intensely political and not ones upon which a court was qualified to adjudicate. The petitioners might disagree, but they were not the ultimate arbiters, and the court ought to decline their invitation to enter the political arena. Separately, it was simply wrong that primary legislation was required in order to bring about withdrawal from the EU. In the absence of any new deal, then as a simple matter of law, the UK will leave, and it will do so in a situation that has been expressly contemplated by Parliament itself in terms of the ‘article 50’ notification and, subsequently, the European Union Withdrawal Act 2018. Accordingly, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate the necessary prima facie case or, at least, any such case was an extremely weak one. In any event, the petitioners had failed to justify the need for interim orders prior to a full hearing of the case next week prior to any question of prorogation coming into effect could occur. There was no good reason for dealing with matters now, where an early hearing had already been granted, no similar interim relief having been sought in any of the other challenges happening across the UK. The approach of the petitioners, in seeking interim orders that were ‘wholly unprecedented’ and went beyond any interference that the courts had ever permitted, was itself ‘unconstitutional’. There was simply no warrant to decide this fundamentally important matter on an interim basis, and the respondent invited the court to refuse the interim orders sought.

The court adjourned to consider matters overnight and is due to give its decision at 10am tomorrow.

Further summaries of these proceedings will be published on this site as soon as they become available after the hearing on 3 September.